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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
A. SCOPE, ORGANIZATION, AND USE OF THE
PUBLICATION
This publication is intended to provide an extensive treatment
of Illinois drainage law as it applies to local, county, and state highway
authorities and adjacent landowners in both agricultural and urban
environments. It focuses on court decisions, state and federal statutes,
and administrative regulations pertinent to drainage-related issues
and disputes that may arise in a variety of circumstances. For example,
the construction, maintenance, and improvement of highways may
affect the drainage of adjacent lands; similarly, urban development
or the installation of drainage improvements on agricultural lands
may affect highway drainage systems.
Chapter II, "The Law of Natural Drainage," discusses the judicial
development and current status of the basic principle of Illinois
drainage law: that higher lands can be drained onto and across lower
lands in most circumstances. This basic principle is much easier to
state than to apply, however, because it is qualified by a "reasona-
bleness" limitation that requires thorough examination of the sur-
rounding circumstances.
Chapter III discusses statutory drainage law. This law is not an
alternative set of legal principles to be applied in lieu of the judicially
developed law of natural drainage. Rather, statutory drainage law
should be viewed as a complement to the law of natural drainage.
Highway authorities, for example, are given a number of additional
drainage-related rights and responsibilities through specific statutes.
The same is true of drainage districts. In addition, specific statutes
address situations such as landowners extending covered drains through
the land of another to reach an outlet and the various rights of
multiple landowners benefiting from a single mutual drain.
Chapter IV, "Bridges and Culverts," addresses the relative re-
sponsibilities of highway authorities, drainage districts, sanitary dis-
tricts, municipalities, and other public and private entities to construct
and maintain bridges or culverts. Unlike the previous two units,
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Chapter IV focuses on the particularly narrow issue of who must
install and maintain the bridge or culvert. The answer to this question
is generally found in Illinois statutes.
The impact of environmental regulations on drainage improve-
ments is discussed in Chapter V. The chapter begins with a discussion
of the judicially created nuisance law and continues with discussions
of the Federal Clean Water Act, the National Environmental Policy
Act, and additional federal laws regarding wetlands, fish and wildlife,
and endangered species. It also discusses the Illinois Soil Erosion and
Sedimentation Control program, which may reduce sedimentation
damage to drainage systems, and the role of the Division of Water
Resources of the Illinois Department of Transportation in regulating
construction in streams or watercourses.
Chapter VI, "Legal Remedies," briefly discusses the jurisdiction
of Illinois courts in resolving drainage disputes aud the kinds of relief
that may be granted by the courts or obtained outside of the courtroom.
It is followed by a summary in Chapter VII.
For a better understanding of the material in this publication,
mini-summaries appear throughout. Generally, they are located be-
neath each major heading within the text. The mini-summaries
provide a quick overview of the conclusions reached in the detailed
discussions that follow. They contain no citations and are essentially
abbreviated statements of law, so the reader should review the complete
text for further explanation. The detailed Table of Contents and the
Glossary may also be of assistance to the reader.
B. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
This publication is based on research completed under the Illinois
Cooperative Highway Research Program entitled "Revision of High-
way Drainage Policy and Practice Manual" and a 1963 publication
entitled Illinois Highway and Agricultural Drainage Laws (University
of Illinois Engineering Experiment Station Circular No. 76). That
publication was dated, however, by several significant court decisions,
including the 1974 Illinois Supreme Court decision Templeton v. Huss,
important legislative developments such as the outpouring of envi-
ronmental legislation in the 1970s, and changes within the Illinois
Department of Transportation. A new research project was called for,
and this publication is a product of that effort.
CHAPTER II: THE LAW OF
NATURAL DRAINAGE
A. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE
This chapter discusses landowners' drainage rights and respon-
sibilities when the natural drainage is away from the land in question,
the dominant estate, or when the natural drainage is toward the land
in question, the servient estate. The rights and responsibilities dis-
cussed herein apply to private individuals as well as to public entities
such as highway authorities or municipalities. Public entities, however,
may acquire additional drainage rights through the exercise of eminent
domain powers, and both public and private entities may acquire
additional drainage rights or responsibilities through agreements with
other parties.
In this chapter, "natural drainage" includes all types of drainage
that naturally occur between the dominant estate (higher land) and
the servient estate (lower land). It also includes artificial drains that
aid natural drainage and that are constructed within the premises of
the dominant estate. The basis of these natural drainage rules is
found in Illinois court cases. The varied principles of the cases to be
discussed in this chapter establish the meaning of the drainage rule
adopted by the Illinois legislature:
Land may be drained in the general course of natural drainage by
either open or covered drains. When such a drain is entirely upon
the land of the owner constructing the drain, he shall not be liable
in damages therefore. 1
It must be remembered, however, that the law of drainage is easier
to state than to apply, and that the law continues to evolve to meet
the needs of a changing society.
The Illinois statutes also specify drainage rights, responsibilities,
and procedures when several landowners act cooperatively to build
mutual drains, where drainage districts or other special-purpose
districts exist, and where a highway authority is involved. These
considerations will be addressed in subsequent chapters.
4 CHAPTER TWO
B. THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL DRAINAGE
LANDOWNERS, INCLUDING HIGHWAY AUTHORITIES, HAVE A RIGHT
TO DRAIN WATER AWAY AS IT WOULD IN A STATE OF NATURE. LOWER
LANDOWNERS, INCLUDING HIGHWAY AUTHORITIES, HAVE A RESPONSI-
BILITY TO ACCEPT WATER FLOWING NATURALLY ONTO OR THROUGH
THEIR LANDS AND HAVE NO RIGHT TO INTERFERE WITH SUCH NATURAL
DRAINAGE.
1 . Meaning, Rationale, and Applicability to Highway
Authorities
Illinois has adopted a modified version of the "civil law rule" of
drainage.
2 Under this rule, the right of drainage is governed by the
law of nature as is apparent in the following statement of the Illinois
Supreme Court:
The right of the owner of the . . . [dominant estate] to drainage is
based simply on the principle that nature has ordained such
drainage, and it is but plain and natural justice that the individual
ownership arising from social laws should be held in accordance
with pre-existing laws and arrangements of nature. As water must
flow, and some rule in regard to it must be established where land
is held under artificial titles created by human law, there can clearly
be no other rule at once so equitable and so easy of application as
that which enforces natural laws. There is no surprise or hardship
in this, for each successive owner takes with whatever advantages
or inconveniences nature has stamped upon his land.
3
The principles of natural drainage apply when one piece of land
is at a higher elevation than the adjoining land, allowing water to
flow from the higher (dominant) to the lower (servient) estate. Natural
flow may originate with surface water derived from rain or snow
falling upon the dominant field or with water in some natural
watercourse fed by remote springs or rising in a spring on the dominant
field/ Individuals hold their lands according to the natural confor-
mation of the ground. The right of the dominant estate owner to
drain on and over the servient estate is based on the principle that
nature has ordained such drainage.
5
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary or the acquisition
of additional rights through the exercise of eminent domain or
prescription, highway authorities have the same drainage rights and
responsibilities as individuals. Thus, highway authorities have a right
to route surface waters that fall or occur naturally on the highway
through the natural and usual channels or outlets on and over lower
lands. They may also construct ditches or drains to conduct surface
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and impounded water on the highway right-of-way into a natural and
usual channel or outlet.6
2. Applicability of Natural Drainage Rule to Diffused
Surface Water
Application of the rule of natural drainage to diffused surface
water as well as to water flowing continuously or intermittently in a
fixed and determinate course has been much discussed. Despite mixed
conclusions, it appears that Illinois should include diffused surface
waters within its natural drainage rule.
7
Farnham notes in his treatise on water and water rights8 that
some commentators thought that the civil law (natural drainage) rule
did not apply unless the waters "have their course regulated from
one ground to another."
9 This implies that water must be more than
simply diffused over the ground, finding its way without definite
course from higher to lower land. Later statements of the rule,
however, were broader and omitted the regulated channel requisite.
For example, Farnham noted that neither the French Civil Code of
1804 nor the early Louisiana Civil Code distinguished between surface
water and diffused surface water. 10 He contended, however, that these
later sources misstated the rule and that under the "true" civil law
rule there is no duty to accept water flowing from higher land unless
it flows in a regulated course. Farnham justifies his position by
claiming that even though diffused water may flow from one piece of
land to the adjoining piece, the flow at all points is uniform and the
volume is not great; therefore the upper landowner is not injured if
the lower owner obstructs the flow. 11
An alternative view is that the rule of natural drainage can be
applied to diffused water just as to other surface water. The civil law
of drainage found in the French Civil Code of 1804 12 (or Code
Napoleon) and the Louisiana Civil Code' :t state that an owner of
lower land may not obstruct the natural flow of surface water. Neither
code requires the flow to be in a regulated channel. Farnham concedes
that the courts have actually followed these broad statements rather
than the "true rule" 14 in attempting to adopt the civil law rule.
American jurisdictions adopting the natural drainage rule have
stated it in its broad form, and Illinois is among these jurisdictions.
Thus it may be argued that the Illinois rule allows the dominant
landowner to have diffused surface water enter the servient estate
with or without a discernible channel.
This argument is supported by Gormley v. Sanford,
1 * the case
adopting the natural drainage rule in Illinois. That is, the flow of
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diffused water is just as much ordained by nature as is the flow of
water in defined channels. Furthermore, there is no language in
Gormley that directly or indirectly excludes diffused water from the
natural drainage rule. Also, one of Farnham's principal justifications
for positing that the lower landowner may obstruct diffused water is
that diffused water causes no material injury. The upper owner is,
therefore, not inconvenienced or injured by being forced to retain it.
16
When the obstruction of diffused water can be shown to injure the
upper owner substantially, the justification for the Farnham position
disappears.
The more pervasive argument seems to favor application of the
drainage rule to diffused water. However, final determination of this
question has yet to be made by the Illinois courts.
3. Criticisms of the Civil Law Rule and Comparison
with the Common Enemy Rule
The civil law of drainage originated in Roman law, and the courts
of Louisiana were the first to adopt the rule in this country.
17 Since
that time, many jurisdictions have adopted some form of the rule.
Other jurisdictions believed that the strict civil law rule constrained
land development by preventing the owner of a dominant estate from
artifically improving the natural drainage. Some of these jurisdictions
adopted an alternative known as the "common enemy rule." Under
this rule, water was regarded as a common enemy, and landowners
had unlimited legal rights to fight this common enemy without regard
to the consequences suffered by neighbors.
18
Strict application of either the civil law rule or the common
enemy rule often caused harsh and inequitable consequences. Thus,
courts began to create exceptions to alleviate otherwise unjust results.
One of these exceptions in Illinois is known as the "good husbandry
exception."
C. THE GOOD HUSBANDRY EXCEPTION
IN THE INTERESTS OF GOOD HUSBANDRY, THE OWNERS OF DOMI-
NANT ESTATES MAY CONSTRUCT OPEN OR COVERED DRAINS ON THEIR
OWN LAND FOR AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES, EVEN THOUGH THE FLOW
OF DRAINAGE WATER MAY BE INCREASED IN THE WATERCOURSES THAT
CARRY THE WATERS FROM THE DOMINANT TO THE SERVIENT ESTATES.
THE OWNERS OF THE DOMINANT ESTATES, HOWEVER, MUST DISCHARGE
THE WATERS AT THE POINTS WHERE THE WATERS WOULD HAVE EN-
TERED THE SERVIENT ESTATES NATURALLY. AND THEY GENERALLY
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MUST NOT CUT OR TILE THROUGH DIVIDES SO AS TO DISCHARGE UPON
THE SERVIENT ESTATES WATERS THAT ORIGINATED FROM DIFFERENT
WATERSHEDS. LARGE DRAINAGE IMPROVEMENTS MAY REQUIRE A PER-
MIT FROM THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND THE
CORPS OF ENGINEERS. THE AMOUNT AND MANNER OF WATER DIS-
CHARGED UPON THE LOWER OWNER MAY BE SUBJECT TO A "REASON-
ABLENESS" LIMITATION. THE APPLICATION OF THE GOOD HUSBANDRY
EXCEPTION IN NONAGRICULTURAL SETTINGS IS DISCUSSED IN SECTION
D ON PAGE 10.
1 . Early Statement of the Rule
Early in the development of Illinois drainage law, courts recognized
that most activities that make land more productive also accelerate
flows. Developing agricultural land often required improving the
drainage of a parcel, which consequently accelerated flows onto the
servient estate. In order to improve agricultural lands, the Illinois
Supreme Court developed a good husbandry exception in the case of
Peck v. Herrington
19
using the following rationale:
The ponds which Peck proposed to drain were merely the collec-
tion of surface water from rain and melting snow, which fell upon
the land. Suppose Peck, instead of tile-draining the ponds, had
filled them up with dirt. This would have caused the water which
before accumulated in the ponds, to flow down the channel . . . upon
the land of Herrington. It will not be pretended that in such a case
he would have violated any rule of law .... If it be true that the
water which would naturally accumulate in these ponds could be
cast upon Herrington's land by filling them up, upon what principle
can the owner of the dominant heritage be denied the right to do
the same thing in another way? If the water which would naturally
accumulate in those ponds can be turned upon Herrington's land
by filling them up, we perceive no reason why the water may not
be drawn off by tile-draining, if good husbandry required it.20
Simply stated, landowners may accelerate the movement of water
on their own land for agricultural purposes as required by good
husbandry. This rule has been interpreted to allow tiling, digging,
construction of artificial ditches on one's land to carry off water more
quickly, or straightening watercourses carrying water across one's
land without liability.
21 The rule is further qualified in the following
sections.
2. The Good Husbandry Qualification
As originally stated, the civil law modification allowing one to
increase the discharge of drainage water into a servient estate was
limited to the interests of good husbandry. But the Illinois courts
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have failed to provide a concrete set of rules defining this term. One
writer has suggested that the term should be broadly applied so that
any legitimate farming operation would justify increasing the flow in
natural drainage channels.
22 The courts seem to have adopted an even
broader interpretation. For example, the right to increase the discharge
of drainage water onto the servient estate has been extended to purely
nonagricultural settings
23 that lack even the slightest good husbandry
interests. The ensuing case law and the codification of the right to
drain lands with open or covered drains
24 has probably mooted the
question of good husbandry, except as it relates to the "reasonableness"
requirement to be discussed below.
3. The Natural Watercourse/Point of Natural
Discharge Qualification
The good husbandry exception arose in a case where the increased
flow was delivered to the servient estate by a natural channel running
from the dominant estate to the servient estate. As we will show
below, the definition of such a natural channel or watercourse is well
settled. But it is less clear if the presence of a natural watercourse
between the dominant and servient estates is necessary to increase
drainage. That is, the treatment of diffused surface water has not
been settled by Illinois courts.
According to the ordinary meaning of the term, a watercourse
must be a stream flowing in a particular direction and in a definite
channel, usually discharging into some other stream or body of water. 25
A natural watercourse is one whose origin is the result of the forces
of nature. Many natural watercourses have been widened, deepened,
or straightened, and these alterations do not change the classification
of the watercourse from natural to artificial.26
An artificial watercourse generally owes its origin to acts of man
and includes drainage ditches, canals, and so forth. For purposes of
this section, artificial watercourses will refer only to man-made
channels on a single tract owned by one or more persons. Artificial
watercourses extending through several tracts with different owners
will be discussed in the following chapter.
Illinois courts have enlarged the basic definition of a natural
watercourse when the term is applied to surface water drainage:
If the conformation of the land is such as to give to the surface
water flowing from one tract to the other a fixed and determinate
course, so as to uniformly discharge it upon the servient tract at a
fixed and definite point, the course thus uniformly followed by the
water in its flow is a watercourse . . . .27
The same court went on to explain that such a natural watercourse
THE LAW OF NATURAL DRAINAGE 9
can probably exist only where a ravine or depression extends from
one tract onto the other so as to gather up the surface water falling
upon the dominant tract and conduct it along a defined channel to
a definite point of discharge upon the servient tract. The court also
mentioned that it does not seem important that the force of the water
flowing from one tract to the other has been insufficient to make a
channel with definite and well-marked sides or banks. Therefore, if
the surface water moves uniformly or habitually over a given course
within reasonable limits as to width, the line of flow is a watercourse
within the meaning of the law applicable to the discharge of surface
water.28
Natural watercourses often require maintenance and improve-
ment. Accordingly, the courts have held that a natural watercourse
is not required to be used only in its natural state: it may be improved
either by being deepened or widened by artificial means or by the
construction of a subsurface drain along the course of its channel to
carry the surface water off the land more effectively. Such improve-
ments do not create a substantially new watercourse, nor do they
amount to an abandonment of the natural watercourse. 29 Landowners
may even change the direction of flow by artificial means on their
own lands, provided the water is restored to its natural channel before
it leaves the owner's property.
30
Is the right to increase the discharge of surface water limited to
circumstances where the water will be carried onto the servient estate
by a natural watercourse from the dominant estate? Regrettably, the
Illinois Supreme Court has not expressly considered this question,
although the issue was considered by at least one nineteenth century
appellate court. In Wagner u. Chaney31 an upper owner artificially
collected diffused water and conducted it onto the lower land through
a tile drain. The court held that the case did not fall within the
Illinois rule allowing an upper owner to collect water and discharge
it onto the lower owner through the natural channel because the
facts showed that there was no such channel. It should be noted,
however, that under the "reasonable use" modification discussed below,
a court might allow such a discharge where the damage to the lower
owner was insignificant or nonexistent.
4. Different Watershed Limitations
The civil law of drainage adopted in Illinois assumes that water
will not be diverted from one natural drainage basin to another. Thus,
the owner of the dominant estate cannot dig through or otherwise
remove a natural divide to discharge water onto the servient estate
that would naturally not have reached it. 32 It appears, however, that
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if a diversion was consistent with reasonable use, it might be allowed
under the more flexible analysis of Templeton u. Huss
33 the most
significant Illinois drainage decision in more than half a century. This
possibility will be addressed below under the "reasonableness" limi-
tation.
5. Permits May Be Required
Clearly, drainage rights and responsibilities are important to the
owners and occupants of the dominant and servient estates. In
addition, the public interest may be important in some drainage
matters, such as flood control, preservation of wildlife habitat, and
water quality. Where the public interest is significantly involved,
regulatory agencies may require a permit before certain drainage
improvements can be initiated. Permit guidelines generally require
the regulatory agency to weigh the private rights against the public
interest. This issue will be discussed in Chapter V.
6. The Limitation of Reasonableness
Landowners have always had some limitations on the manner in
which they utilized their natural drainage rights. Landowners could
not accelerate water maliciously or in a manner that would create
unreasonable risks of damage to another.34 For example, a lower owner
could get damages if a tile line was terminated next to the servient
estate without properly boxing it to minimize erosion. The concept
of "reasonableness" was to become even more important after the
landmark 1974 Illinois Supreme Court case of Templeton u. Huss. 35
Templeton involved a drainage problem created by urbanization,
but the court's basic statement of the law can easily be applied to
future agricultural drainage controversies. That basic statement was
that increased flow had to be consistent with the
"policy of reason-
ableness of use which led initially to the good husbandry exception."36
For further insight into this limitation, let us consider a landowner's
rights to improve drainage in nonagricultural applications.
D. CHANGING NATURAL DRAINAGE IN
NONAGRICULTURAL LAND USES
IN NONAGRICULTURAL LAND USES AND ABSENT LOCAL ORDINANCES
SPECIFYING STORM DRAINAGE AND DETENTION REQUIREMENTS, OWN-
ERS OF DOMINANT ESTATES MAY DRAIN THEIR LANDS INTO PUBLIC
DRAINS OR ONTO SERVIENT LANDS AS LONG AS THE INCREASED FLOW
OF SURFACE WATERS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE POLICY OF REASONA-
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BLENESS OF USE. IN SOME CASES, THE DRAINAGE IMPROVEMENT CON-
TEMPLATED FOR THE DOMINANT ESTATE WILL REQUIRE A PERMIT FROM
THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND THE CORPS OF
ENGINEERS.
1. Extension of the Good Husbandry Rule to
Nonagricultural Land Uses by Case Law
As the emphasis in Illinois shifted from agricultural to urban
development, the good husbandry doctrine allowing artificial improve-
ment of natural drainage was applied outside of agricultural devel-
opment land uses.
37
Unfortunately, the good husbandry doctrine was
not properly suited to urbanization. In interpreting the good husbandry
doctrine, virtually any increase in the drainage burden upon the
servient estate was upheld. Between 1884, the year the good husbandry
doctrine was established, and 1974, the Illinois Supreme Court found
not one single increase on the servient estate that was sufficient to
permit recovery of damages. It appeared that the servient owner could
be compensated only in situations in which the dominant owner
diverted water from another watershed.38
Although this result is probably justified in most agricultural
settings, urban development presents a more difficult problem. Urban
lands tend to be of much greater value and tend to create more
runoff. The increased value of a developed parcel often cannot offset
the losses to other highly developed servient parcels. Also, the
increased quantity of runoff from developed land is likely to damage
servient land more than runoff from agricultural land. The good
husbandry exception included no well-defined test for balancing the
benefit of the developer against the burden on the servient estate.39
In response to this defect in the good husbandry exception, the Illinois
Supreme Court modified the Illinois natural drainage law in 1974.
Templeton u. Huss,
40 the first significant modification since the nine-
teenth century, adopted a reasonable use requirement for the natural
drainage rule.
41
2. Adoption of the Reasonable Use Limitation
Templeton v. Huss42 was the first case decided by the Illinois
Supreme Court that discussed the extent to which drainage may be
altered when land is developed for other than agricultural purposes. 43
In Templeton, the defendants owned the dominant estate, which they
subdivided and developed. The plaintiff owned the servient estate, a
parcel of farmland. Plaintiff alleged that in converting their parcel
of farmland into a residential subdivision, the defendants had in-
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creased both the amount and rate of surface water runoff flowing
onto the plaintiff's land. This violated the natural drainage law. The
trial court found that there had been no diversion from another
watershed and for that reason entered judgment for the defendants.
On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed the legal issue of whether
a dominant estate owner's liability for damage from increased surface
runoff was limited to that caused by a diversion from another
watershed. The court concluded it was not. After analyzing the
development of Illinois drainage law, the court stated that
"[interference with natural drainage has been limited to that which
was incidental to the reasonable development of the dominant estate
for agricultural purposes."
44
However, the court recognized that natural
drainage could be altered substantially by developments, presumably
such as urbanization, that interfere with the natural seepage of water
into the soil of the dominant estate. The court decided that the
principle that had prevented unreasonable changes in lateral drainage
should be applied to changes that unreasonably interfere with natural
seepage:
The question which must be confronted is whether the increased
flow of surface waters from the land of the defendants to that of
the plaintiff, regardless of whether it was caused by diversion from
another watershed, the installation of septic tanks, the grading and
paving of streets, or the construction of houses, basements and
appurtenances, was beyond a range consistent with the policy of
reasonableness of use which led initially to the good husbandry
exception.
45
While the decision uses the term "reasonable" on several occasions,
commentators46 have shown the court's meaning to be less than
entirely clear.
3. Interpreting the Templeton Decision
The narrowest reading of the decision is simply that a servient
estate is not limited to recovery only when the dominant estate diverts
water from another watershed.47 The broadest reading is that Illinois
has now adopted the "reasonableness of use" doctrine and abandoned
the civil law or natural drainage theory.
48
However, subsequent ap-
pellate court cases show that the Illinois courts are taking a middle
ground in interpreting Templeton rather than either of these extremes.
It is apparent that Illinois is not completely abandoning the
natural drainage rule. Appellate court cases decided after Templeton
address the natural drainage rule and do not cite Templeton as
abandoning the rule in Illinois. 49 Furthermore, the criteria of the good
husbandry exception still appear to apply to agricultural situations.
50
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Courts citing Templeton as being consistent with the good husbandry
exception in agricultural settings have not expressly indicated that
Templeton altered it. If it has not, all the prior good husbandry case
law still applies. The importance of this interpretation is that in an
agricultural setting, diversion from another watershed or discharge
other than at a natural drainage point may be essential for a servient
landowner to recover. 51 Furthermore, the owner of a dominant estate
may still have a virtually unlimited right to increase the drainage
from agricultural land."
In urban settings the appellate courts consider Templeton to
require the dominant landowner to conform his or her alteration of
natural drainage to a standard of reasonableness. The most important
change to the existing drainage law is the limitation of the right to
increase the flow upon the servient estate.
51 In addition, the dominant
owner may divert drainage from another watershed if it is in keeping
with the standard of reasonableness.54 Unfortunately, "reasonable-
ness" is not clear, although standards are increasingly incorporated
in regulations governing storm drainage system design and runoff
detention.
In one case discussing the standard of reasonableness when
drainage is increased, the reasonableness of the increase in drainage
was the sole inquiry.
55 Other cases, however, have indicated that the
development of the dominant estate and the impact on the drainage
should be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of use.
56 Tem-
pleton appears to embrace this latter interpretation. Due to the
uncertainty of Illinois law, reference to other jurisdictions adopting
the reasonable use theory may be helpful in determining the criteria
to be applied in a reasonable use analysis.
The California Supreme Court adopted a comprehensive modi-
fication of the civil law rule preventing both the upper and the lower
landowner from acting unreasonably and still being immune from all
liability. Its rule adopts the broader reasonableness of use analysis
apparently embraced by the court in Templeton. In its opinion, the
California Supreme Court noted:
The issue of reasonableness becomes a question of fact to be
determined in each case upon a consideration of all the relevant
circumstances, including such factors as the amount of harm caused,
the foreseeability of the harm which results, the purpose or motive
with which the possessor acted, and all other relevant matter .... It
is properly a consideration in land development problems whether
the utility of the possessor's use of his land outweighs the gravity
of the harm which results from his alteration of the flow of surface
waters. . . . The gravity of harm is its seriousness from an objective
viewpoint, while the utility of conduct is its meritoriousness from
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the same viewpoint If the weight is on the side of him who
alters the natural watercourse, then he has acted reasonably and
without liability; if the harm to the lower landowner is unreasonably
severe, then the economic costs incident to the expulsion of surface
waters must be borne by the upper owner whose development caused
the damage.
57
In any event, the owner of the servient estate has the burden of
proving that the acts were inconsistent with reasonable use.
58 Ref-
erence to the existing case law is helpful in determining reasonable
conduct.*9
4. Permit Requirements
The public interest is important in nonagricultural drainage
matters just as it is in agricultural drainage matters. Where the public
interest is significantly involved, such as where the drainage activity
will have impact on flood control, water quality, or wildlife habitat,
regulatory agencies may require a permit for drainage improvement.
Permit requirements generally command the regulatory agency to
weigh drainage rights against the public interest. They will be dis-
cussed in Chapter V.
E. HIGHWAY DITCHES AND ADJACENT LAND
DRAINAGE
THE PURPOSE OF HIGHWAY DITCHES AND SUBSURFACE DRAINS is
TO DRAIN EXCESS WATER OFF THE HIGHWAY RIGHT-OF-WAY. HIGHWAY
AUTHORITIES ARE NOT OBLIGATED TO CONSTRUCT DITCHES AND SUB-
SURFACE DRAINS TO IMPROVE THE NATURAL DRAINAGE ON ADJACENT
LANDS. HOWEVER, ABSENT THE ACQUISITION OF AN EASEMENT OF
OBSTRUCTION BY AGREEMENT, PRESCRIPTION, OR CONDEMNATION,
THE HIGHWAY AUTHORITY HAS NO RIGHT TO OBSTRUCT NATURAL
DRAINAGE ACROSS ITS RIGHT-OF-WAY.
1. Highway Ditches and Tile as Outlets for Drainage
Improvements on Adjacent Property
Adjacent landowners sometimes believe that highway authorities
are obligated to drain adjacent lands and protect them from the
overflow of water naturally thrown upon them. The court has held
that highway authorities are not responsible for providing improved
drainage to protect the adjacent landowner from the natural overflow
of water.**' Also, highway authorities cannot bind themselves by
agreement to improve drainage for adjacent areas unless it is made
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necessary by their acts. On the other hand, they cannot cause adjacent
owners' lands to be overflowed more than they had been naturally.61
2. Obstructing Flow
Highway authorities have no more rights to obstruct natural
drainage than do private individuals, except to the extent that such
rights are obtained by condemnation and the payment of just com-
pensation. Thus, the highway authorities are liable for damage caused
by 1) failure to install adequate culverts or bridges to accommodate
natural drainage across the highway right-of-way;62 2) by negligent
installation of culverts or other structures that do not function
properly;
63
or 3) by negligent maintenance of the improvements.64
Similarly, a highway authority has no more obligation or duty
than a private individual to restrict flows to protect a servient estate.
Thus, the highway authority may increase the drainage burden upon
a servient estate, subject to a standard of reasonableness. In the same
fashion, the highway authority has the right and is indeed obligated
to pass on legally increased flows that cross its right-of-way.
65
F. MAINTENANCE OF NATURAL DRAINS
ACROSS SERVIENT LANDS
OWNERS OF SERVIENT ESTATES MAY NOT INTENTIONALLY OB-
STRUCT WATERCOURSES FLOWING ACROSS THEIR LANDS, BUT THEY
HAVE NO DUTY TO KEEP THEM CLEAR OF NATURALLY OCCURRING
BRUSH, SILT, OR DEBRIS. OWNERS OF DOMINANT ESTATES, BECAUSE OF
THEIR DRAINAGE EASEMENTS, HAVE RIGHTS TO GO UPON THE SERVIENT
ESTATES AND MAKE REPAIRS AS LONG AS THEY DO NOT CAUSE UNNEC-
ESSARY INJURY TO THE SERVIENT ESTATE. ACCESS PERMITS ARE RE-
QUIRED BEFORE DOING ANY WORK ON A HIGHWAY RIGHT-OF-WAY.
It is the right of the owner of a drainage easement to keep it in
repair. But no obligation to make repairs is generally imposed upon
those whose lands are placed in servitude.
66
Ordinarily, the owner of
the easement has the right to go onto the servient estate to keep the
drain in repair if the repair can be accomplished without unnecessary
injury to the land. The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that:
As a general proposition, whoever has an easement in or over
another's land has the right to do all such things as are necessary
to preserve the easement that is, he may keep it in repair and
has the right of access to make the necessary repairs. ... It would
seem, therefore, that the common law annexes to the easement of
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a drain in another's land the right to go upon such land and clean
out or repair such drain without doing unnecessary injury to the
land.67
The court has further mentioned that such an interpretation is
consistent with fundamental concepts respecting property rights:
property owners themselves are expected to protect those rights, while
others are expected not to invade them.
68 This rule applies to all
drainage easements, whether created by nature, by agreement, by
condemnation, or by prescription.
This right of self-help probably does not extend to owners of
dominant estates who have drainage easements across highway rights-
of-way, because it will be difficult for these persons to make repairs
in the right-of-way without endangering public use of the highway.
69
However, highway authorities will issue permits in many instances
to allow private landowners to work in the highway right-of-way, for
instance to repair cross-drainage structures.
70 And as discussed in the
preceding section, if the highway authority's negligence causes ob-
struction, the landowner may sue for damages or an injunction.
G. ALTERING RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF
NATURAL DRAINAGE THROUGH AGREEMENT,
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS, AND EMINENT
DOMAIN
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF NATURAL DRAINAGE CAN BE
ALTERED BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, THROUGH PRESCRIP-
TIVE EASEMENTS, AND, WHERE A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY IS INVOLVED,
THROUGH EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN. IN ILLINOIS,
THE TIME PERIOD NECESSARY TO ACQUIRE AN EASEMENT OF DRAINAGE
OR OBSTRUCTION BY PRESCRIPTION IS TWENTY YEARS.
1. Agreements and Eminent Domain
Drainage rights, like other property rights, can be voluntarily
transferred between parties and can be condemned by highway
authorities or other governmental entities.
71 When such rights are
condemned, just compensation must be paid.
2. Prescriptive Easements of Drainage or Obstruction
When a landowner is harmed by another owner and fails to
enforce his rights, the harmful practice may itself become a right.
For example, if an owner of higher ground fails to take action when
the owner of lower land dams or obstructs the flow of surface water,
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the lower landowner may acquire an easement to maintain the dam
by what is known as prescriptive use. The period of use recognized
in Illinois is twenty years. Likewise, the owner of lower land may
acquire a right to have no surface water drain on his or her land
from higher ground when the water has been diverted from the lower
ground for the prescriptive period. By this same process, the higher
landowner may acquire the right to change the place where his or
her surface water enters lower ground or to maintain other artificial
conditions not permitted under the rules of natural drainage.
7
-'
For a prescriptive easement to arise, the use must generally have
been 1) adverse, 2) uninterrupted for a period of at least twenty years,
or when land is used as a public highway, fifteen years, 7 ' 3) exclusive,
4) continuous, and 5) under a claim of right. 74 Acquisition of such a
right is not easily determined. For example, consider a situation in
which an underground drain is not visible. Its existence would not
constitute a prescriptive easement unless the owner of the servient
estate has actual or constructive notice of the subsurface drain. ?r'
The scope of a prescriptive easement is limited to the dominant
landowner's use of the property. Included within the scope of the
easement are those actions necessary to protect that use. For example,
it has been held that a drainage ditch essential to make a highway
easement effective is included within a prescriptive highway easement,
provided it is maintained and used by the public. 76
Easements acquired by prescription may extend beyond the
original parties that created them. For example, the owner of a
dominant estate diverted water from its natural course by constructing
an artificial channel. Water flowed through it continuously for more
than twenty years. The court held that other proprietors who benefited
thereby had an easement by prescription in the new watercourse and
that the water could not be restored to its original course.
77 This rule
applies even though the affected landowners are not contiguous.
78
By the same process, a prescriptive easement of obstruction may
be created that extinguishes the natural drainage easement of the
dominant landowner. The following examples illustrate a drainage
easement being extinguished.
1. A dominant landowner diverts drainage flow from servient land,
and the servient landowner fills the old ditch and farms it for
twenty years. In this instance, all the elements of adverse possession
are met, and the easement of obstruction is established. The
servient landowner is entitled to keep the ditch filled.
2. Same facts as above, but the servient farmer sells his land after
fifteen years, and a new owner possesses it for ten years. In this
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instance, the new servient owner would have satisfied the contin-
uous twenty-year requirement. Illinois law allows the prescriptive
period of prior owners and occupiers to be "tacked onto" the period
of the new owner or occupier.
79
3. Same basic facts as above, but the servient landowner does nothing
to the ditch. In this instance, there is no action adverse to the
dominant landowner's easement. Thus, there is no prescriptive
easement of obstruction.
4. In this example, the dominant landowner builds an obstruction
that reduces the maximum natural flow to the servient estate for
a period of twenty years. The dominant landowner now proposes
to remove the obstruction and permit the full natural flow.
In this instance, the lower landowner would contend that while
nature dictated an easement for all natural flows, the dominant
landowner's action over the statutory period has reduced the
quantity of water that may be conducted through the easement.
To prevail under a prescription theory, the servient landowner
would have to show action on his part adverse to the full natural
easement. 80 An action such as farming up to the banks of the
drain where before an untillable flood plain existed would
probably not be sufficient. The act of farming is not inconsistent
with the dominant landowner's right to pass off his drainage. In
contrast, filling the ditch and replacing it with an underground
tile sufficient to carry only the restricted flows would be physically
inconsistent with the full extent of the drainage easement. This
would possibly support a claim of prescription, provided the dom-
inant landowner has knowledge of the filling and the installation
of underground tile.
Illinois courts, however, have rejected the notion that an under-
ground sewer can create a prescriptive right unless the party who
stands to surrender a prescriptive easement has actual or construc-
tive knowledge of it.
81
The doctrine of equitable estoppel82 probably would not apply
either. Shontz u. Metzger1
*
is the only Illinois case that considers
the application of equitable estoppel in a drainage case. The decision
holds that the doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked against a
dominant landowner to prevent him or her from removing a levee
built by a servient estate owner that causes water to be cast back
upon the dominant landowner's property.
5. Same facts as number 4 above, but now assume that the dominant
landowner is a highway authority that has built an undersized
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culvert and now wishes to increase its size to accommodate the
full natural flow.
The analysis is the same as that in number 4. The servient
landowner would not have a right to the diminished flows against
a governmental agency under a prescription theory. As we will
discuss below, rights of adverse possession or prescription cannot
be obtained against a governmental entity.
In several instances, however, Illinois courts have permitted a
claim of equitable estoppel to prevent the state from asserting a
proprietary right. The decisive case, Mickey u. Illinois Central R.R.
Company, shows that only rare circumstances will permit an
estoppel holding against the state:
Mere nonaction by governmental officers is not sufficient to work
an estoppel and that before the doctrine can be invoked against
the state or a municipality there must have been some positive acts
by officials which may have induced the action of the adverse party
under circumstances where it would be inequitable to permit the
corporation to stultify itself by retracting what its officers had
previously done.
84
It is also clear that a municipality can be estopped only in extreme
circumstances. Courts require an affirmative act and inducement
of substantial reliance to make an equitable estoppel against a
city.
85
The reluctance of a court to apply equitable estoppel against a
public entity, along with precedent established in Shontz u. Metzger
make it unlikely that the doctrine will be applied against a highway
authority.
6. In this example, the dominant landowner constructs a culvert
sufficient to accommodate the existing flows. However, twenty
years pass and the natural flows have legally increased. The
dominant landowner now constructs a larger culvert.
In this instance, the analysis starts with the rule of natural drainage
as applied by Illinois courts. Clearly, when natural flows are legally
increased, the servient owner has a legal obligation to accept the
flows. Thus, under these facts, because the flow has legally increased
in the past twenty years, the dominant landowner is entitled to
pass this water to the servient landowner by the construction of
a larger culvert. Moreover, the drainage code imposes a legal duty
on the highway authority to provide the larger culvert whenever
needed.
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3. Applicability of Prescriptive Easements to
Governmental Entities
Individuals may not acquire rights by prescription from the state,
counties, cities, towns, and other municipal corporations when public
rights are at issue.
87 The courts have distinguished between public
and private rights by holding that public rights or uses are those in
which the public has an interest in common with the people. Private
rights or uses are those enjoyed by inhabitants of a local district
exclusively and in which the public has no interest.
88 Courts have
specifically held that public highways are not subject to adverse
possession by a private party.
89 This includes the drainage rights
associated with highway lands.
90
Although governmental bodies generally cannot lose rights to
private parties by prescription, these bodies may nevertheless acquire
rights by prescription. The courts have held that the continued and
uninterrupted use of land as a highway for the statutory period is
presumed to have been under a claim of right and can create a
prescriptive right in favor of the public.
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CHAPTER III: STATUTORY
DRAINAGE LAW
A. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE
As the preceding discussion has shown, the concept of natural
drainage is founded on the relative position of land. The discussion
therefore was in terms of dominant and servient lands, rather than
the nature of the landowner. Drainage statutes, however, frequently
specify rights and duties of particular parties such as highway au-
thorities, individual landowners, and drainage districts. Clarity there-
fore suggests that statutory drainage be discussed in the same terms.
With regard to highway authorities, the primary questions concern
how they may acquire drainage rights, how the drainage of adjacent
lands may interfere with the highway, and whether the highway
authorities must maintain drainage facilities. In brief, the highway
authorities may obtain drainage easements through eminent domain
proceedings, through contracts expressly authorized by statute, or
through contracts outside of statutory provision. Highway Code
section 117' states that parties may not obstruct a highway without
permission. This section forbids draining land that causes injury to
the highway, except for drainage pursuant to the natural drainage
laws. Finally, the Highway Code provides that the highway authority
must maintain drainage facilities as well as the highway surface. 2
The section dealing with drainage districts emphasizes statutory
provisions affecting highways. It addresses issues such as whether a
highway authority may be assessed by a drainage district, the extent
to which a drainage district can use highway property, when a drainage
district has eminent domain power, whether particular land can be
annexed by a drainage district, and the ability of a district to increase
stream flows. As we will show, drainage districts cannot assess highway
authorities. Highway authorities appear to be able to grant permission
to a drainage district to use highway lands, subject to abutting
landowners' property rights. The Drainage Code apparently permits
the exercise of the power of eminent domain against the highway
27
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authority. It also appears that highway property can be annexed into
a drainage district, although it cannot be assessed.
Questions concerning individual landowners are primarily covered
in the sections addressing drainage districts and highway authorities.
Additional code provisions limit interference with the lateral support
of a highway and require that drains installed by a landowner be
recorded. This chapter also discusses a landowner's right to extend
a drain through another's land. While the Drainage Code authorizes
such an action, there is some question as to the constitutionality of
the provision. Finally, this chapter considers the construction of
drains and levees for mutual benefit. The code provisions are appli-
cable to both individuals and highway authorities, although highway
authorities cannot be compelled to contribute to the expenses involved
in a mutual drainage system. Drainage districts are excluded from
membership in a mutual drainage system.
B. HIGHWAY AUTHORITIES
A HIGHWAY AUTHORITY IS SUBJECT TO THE NATURAL DRAINAGE
LAW. THROUGH THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, HOWEVER, A HIGH-
WAY AUTHORITY MAY MODIFY ITS NATURAL DRAINAGE RIGHTS. IN
ADDITION, A HIGHWAY AUTHORITY MAY CONTRACT WITH LANDOWNERS
TO ALTER ITS DRAINAGE OBLIGATIONS. THE HIGHWAY CODE MAKES IT
ILLEGAL TO OBSTRUCT OR INJURE A HIGHWAY AND REQUIRES A PERMIT
TO DO ANY WORK IN A RIGHT-OF-WAY. IN GENERAL, A HIGHWAY AU-
THORITY IS LIABLE FOR MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OF DITCHES IN A
RIGHT-OF-WAY THAT BENEFITS THE HIGHWAY.
1. Eminent Domain
The preceding chapter explained the applicability of the rules of
natural drainage to Illinois highways. It pointed out that the drainage
of highways across adjoining lands is governed by the same rules
applying to private land, except where the highway authorities have
acquired rights through eminent domain. 3 Generally, a landowner may
only obtain an easement to drain his or her land outside of the course
of natural drainage by deed or prescription. However, by statute
highway authorities also may obtain drainage rights through the use
of eminent domain. 4
a. Acquisition of property. Highway Code sections 4-502, 5-
802, and 6-802 each provide substantially as follows:
When the [highway] authority deems it necessary to build, widen,
alter, relocate or straighten any ditch, drain or watercourse in order
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to drain or protect any highway or highway structure it is authorized
to construct, maintain or operate, it may acquire the necessary
property, or such interest or right therein as may be required, by
gift or purchase or, if the compensation or damages cannot be
agreed upon, by the exercise of the right of eminent domain under
the eminent domain laws of the state.5
(1) Constitutionality and procedure. Article I Section 15 of the
1970 Constitution qualifies the right of eminent domain for the state:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation as provided by law. Such compensation
shall be determined by a jury as provided by law.6
Procedurally, the statute seems to require that highway authorities
attempt to acquire the desired property by gift or purchase before
instituting eminent domain proceedings. Note the wording under the
previously mentioned sections of the statute pertaining to the acqui-
sition of property: ". . . by gift or purchase or, if the compensation or
damages cannot be agreed upon, by the exercise of the right of
eminent domain . . . ." 7 An earlier statute read, "[UJnless the owner
of such land, or his agent, shall first consent to the cutting of such
ditches, the commissioners shall apply to any justice of the peace . . . ."8
This clause was interpreted to mean that the statutory method of
acquiring the land must be preceded by an offer of just compensation
to the owner and his or her refusal to accept that offer.9 The present
wording would probably be interpreted similarly.
(2) Determination of necessity. The statute provides that eminent
domain proceedings may be exercised when the highway authority
"deems it necessary." The question of necessity is determined by the
highway authorities acting in their official capacity and is beyond the
control and jurisdiction of the courts except for fraud or a clear
purpose of oppression.
10 The exercise of discretion will be questioned
by a court only when a citizen's private rights are improperly invaded. 11
(3) Direction of flow. The statutory provision is in no way limited
by the natural flow of water. The court has expressly stated that the
provision is intended to enable highway authorities to convey water
from the highway in a direction other than its natural course.
12
Thus,
a highway authority can divert water as long as it has acquired the
necessary easements from affected parties.
(4) Limitation of sewage. The right of eminent domain may not
be used for the purpose of carrying off sewage deposited on the
highway by the drains of an incorporated village. The statute does
not contemplate such usage.
13
(5) Limitation on subsequent negligence. When land is acquired
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by eminent domain for highway purposes, certain injuries to the
landowner are expected and included in the eminent domain award.
However, condemnation by eminent domain is no bar to a suit by
the landowner for subsequent injury. The injury may grow out of the
negligence and lack of skill of the public authority in constructing
drains in the highway.
14
(6) Lands dedicated to public use. Illinois courts have taken the
position that the authority to condemn lands already devoted to
public use must be explicitly granted and will not be implied by a
general grant of eminent domain power. 15
Sections 4-502, 5-802, and 6-802 of the Highway Code offer no
explicit grant of power to condemn property already devoted to public
purposes, such as a drainage district's drains. However, in some
situations, if the state legislature intends a highway authority to have
the power to condemn lands previously devoted to a public use, the
taking will be allowed.
16
b. Entry on lands to make surveys. In order to make surveys
to determine how much land must be taken for a highway project,
including subsurface surveys, the highway authority may enter the
lands or waters of another after giving written notice to the known
owners or occupants. Only unavoidable damages to crops or trees
incidental to a survey are permissible, and the highway authority
must compensate the landowner for any of these damages.
17
2. Contracts with Owners or Occupants of Adjoining
Land
a. Contracts under statutory provisions
(1) Tile drains. Highway Code section 9-107 provides:
Whenever the highway authorities are about to lay a tile along any
public highway the highway authorities may contract with the
owners or occupants of adjoining land to lay a larger tile than would
be necessary to drain the highway, and permit connection therewith
by such contracting parties to drain their lands. 18
No cases actually apply this statute, although two cases mention
it. In one the court pointed out that under the facts of the case, the
highway authorities were not taking steps to tile-drain the highway;
therefore, the provision did not apply to the question involved.
19 In
the other case the adjoining owner had constructed a tile drain in
the highway. The court found that the drain benefited the highway,
implying that it was part of the highway drainage system and not
merely a private drain. As such, the tile was permitted to remain in
service and the highway authority was responsible for its maintenance.
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As partial justification for allowing the tile to remain in the highway,
the court cited the above statute and held that highway authorities
"have a right to lay tile in the road and to make contracts with
adjoining owners for that purpose."20 Thus a loose interpretation of
the statute aided the court in arriving at a desirable decision.
(2) Open ditches and drains. Highway Code section 9-113 applies
to the construction of ditches or drains along a highway by any
"public utility company, municipal corporation, or other public or
private corporation, association, or person."
21 The section provides
that such construction may only be undertaken after first obtaining
the written consent of the appropriate highway authority. Consent is
granted to terms and conditions that are consistent with the Highway
Code and are deemed by the authority to be in the best public interest.
Section 9-113 also recognizes that many highways are constructed
upon right-of-way easements obtained from abutting landowners.
Construction of drainage facilities by parties other than the highway
authority that do not benefit the highway are outside the scope of
the highway authority's highway easement across the land of others. 22
To avoid a possible illegal taking of the abutting landowner's property,
secton 9-113 provides that:
The petitioner shall pay to the owners of property abutting upon
the affected highways established as though by common law plat
all damages the owners may sustain by reason of such use of the
highway, such damage to be ascertained and paid in the manner
provided by law for the exercise of the right of eminent domain. 211
It is likely that section 9-113 can only be applied by public utility
companies, municipal corporations, or other public or private cor-
porations, associations, or people who independently possess the
statutory right of eminent domain. That is, it is likely that a drainage
district, which the legislature has vested with the power of eminent
domain,2* could use section 9-113 to construct a ditch in a highway
easement. However, an individual landowner, such as a farmer wishing
to drain his or her own land, may be prohibited from using the
highway easement to do so.
Although they predate section 9-113, two cases have treated the
situation of a highway authority granting a landowner permission to
construct a ditch along a highway. In each case the highway authority
gave the landowner permission to construct a ditch in the highway
right-of-way solely to drain his or her own property. Both ditches
were constructed in the highway right-of-way where it fronted on a
second landowner's property. In other words, the ditch began on the
land of the party who had received permission from the highway
authority and ran into the highway property, alongside the land of
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another. In each case the question was whether these ditches must
be allowed to remain in the highway right-of-way.
In denying the right of the landowner to maintain the ditch, the
court in the first case held that highway authorities cannot bind the
public to furnish drainage for private lands. A mere license or
permission for a private individual to dig a ditch along the highway,
even though he or she acts and expends money upon such permission,
is not a grant of a perpetual right for the individual to drain his or
her land through this ditch. The authorities cannot grant away the
use of the right-of-way of the public highway to a private person.
25
Section 9-113 now requires adequate consideration for an individual's
use of a highway right-of-way.26
The second case reached a similar conclusion. This holding,
however, was based on the rule that highway authorities own only
an easement in the highway land, and the fee remains in the adjoining
owner.
27
Highway authorities have no right to grant abutting land-
owners the privilege of digging a ditch along the highway fronting
the property of another landowner: it would impose an additional
burden and servitude on such land that is inconsistent with the
limited rights of the public in the highway.
28 The case raises the
notion that without the power of eminent domain, a party can only
construct an open ditch along a highway by securing the permission
of all contiguous landowners whose property is affected by the
construction. Section 9-113(1) recognizes this notion, stating that no
agreement with a highway authority is binding upon the owner of a
fee.
29
b. Contracts outside statutory provisions. Highway author-
ities are free to contract for any rights of drainage outside of these
statutory provisions. For example, a highway authority may contract
with a private landowner to have him or her dispose of highway
runoff. An 1886 appellate court decision held that if a contract
contemplated the lawful disposition of the water by the landowner,
the highway authority would not be liable for subsequent unlawful
disposition. The court based its decision on the fact that the highway
authority was not in privity to the unlawful extension of the tile
drain that caused the flooding.
30
Under modern agency principles, this decision may no longer be
persuasive. Rather, the trend today is towards greater liability for a
principal due to the unlawful or negligent acts of his or her agent.
31
In addition, the current state constitution has abolished sovereign
immunity, except as provided by law.32 Thus, it appears likely that a
highway authority could be liable for the unlawful actions of a
landowner with whom it contracts.
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3. Consultation with Local Agencies
Section 9-101.1 of the Highway Code provides:
Whenever the proper highway authority is about to construct or
improve the drainage structures of a State highway, county highways,
or county unit district road, the highway authority shall meet and
consult with the authorities of any municipality adjacent to or
through which such highway or road runs. The purpose of such
meetings is to work out an agreement with such municipality and
all other interested agencies and units of local government as to
the extent of such drainage construction or improvement.
33
This provision appears to compel the highway authority to co-
operate with local authorities to avoid duplication of efforts in
providing drainage and to encourage more efficient use of funds. In
addition, it may be intended to promote local input on projects that
will impact on local concerns.
34
4. Injuring or Obstructing Highways
a. Statutory provisions. Highway Code section 9-117 reads:
If any person injures or obstructs a public highway by. . . plowing
or digging any ditch ... or by turning a current of water so as to
saturate, wash, or damage ... or by plowing in or across or on the
slopes of the side gutters or ditches, or by placing any material in
such ditches . . . without the permission of the highway author-
ity. .. he shall be guilty of a petty offense ....
The highway authority ... after having given 10 days no-
tice . . . may ... fill up any ditch . . . except ditches necessary to the
drainage of an adjoining farm emptying into a ditch upon the
highway ....
However, this section shall not apply to any person . . . through or
along whose land a public highway may pass, who shall desire to
drain his land, and who shall give due notice to the proper highway
authority of such intention, and who shall first secure from such
highway authority written permission for any work, ditching, or
excavating he proposes to do within the limits of the highway.
'''
b. Turning a current of water. "Turning a current of water
so as to saturate, wash, or damage" is included as an offense under
section 9-117 of the Highway Code. This provision is interpreted
broadly by the courts. It has been held applicable to both narrow
streams and diffused drainage.38
Furthermore, it would appear that this provision covers the various
types of unlawful water diversions discussed under natural drainage
in Chapter II.
c. Notice. The initial fine provided for in the statute is imposed
for the obstruction itself. If the obstruction is allowed to continue,
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an additional fine may be recovered. No notice is necessary to recover
the initial penalty, whereas notice must be given before the subsequent
fine may be imposed.37
d. Necessity for ditch. Ditches necessary to drain an adjoining
farm and that empty into a ditch upon the highway are excluded
from the category of obstructions. The court has held that a ditch
allowing water from adjoining lands to flow naturally into a highway
ditch is "necessary." Conversely, a ditch that diverts water from its
natural course in order to reach the highway is not necessary and is
not protected by the statute.
38
The exclusion of necessary ditches from the definition of obstruc-
tion seems to pertain to both the highway authority's right to fill a
ditch and to the imposition of the petty offense. Since the Drainage
Code recognizes the right to natural drainage,39 it would seem contrary
to its intent to consider the exercise of that right a petty offense.
e. A ditch as an obstruction. The circumstances are not clear
under which a ditch constructed in the highway right-of-way by an
adjoining landowner without permission would constitute an obstruc-
tion. The confusion arises because the highway authorities often are
not considered owners of the land within the highway. Often the
public has an easement in the highway, and the fee remains in the
adjoining owner who may exercise every right of ownership not
inconsistent with the easement of the public.
40
This is the general rule in Illinois. However, under the wording
of the Illinois Highway Code and under the eminent domain laws of
the state, it is possible for the highway authority to obtain the entire
fee interest rather than a mere easement in any land taken. Note
the language of two code sectons: "The Department, in its name, or
any county may acquire the fee simple title, or such lesser interest
as may be desired, to any land, rights, or other property necessary
for the construction, maintenance, or operation of State highway. . ";
41
and ". . . it may acquire the necessary property or such interest or
right therein as may be required . . . ," 42 If the entire fee is taken from
the adjoining owner, the problems surrounding the landowner's rights
will not exist when an easement alone is taken.
Uncertainty surrounds the rights of an adjoining owner who
constructs a ditch in the highway right-of-way without permission
but who still has the fee interest in the property. An early appellate
decision held that "the digging of the ditch inside the limits of the
highway is of itself an injury. It is a trespass unless the digging is by
permission or under some legal right."
43 The landowner involved had
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not secured permission, and a fine was therefore imposed. The fact
that he was the fee owner was not discussed. The appellate court
apparently did not feel that this was sufficient justification for his
act; his ownership of the fee was not considered to be "some legal
right."
On the other hand, the adjoining owner's title to the fee has been
interpreted as giving him or her the right to use the highway land in
any manner he or she wishes, including for the construction of a
ditch. The easement of the highway must not be affected. The digging
of the ditch in itself was not considered an obstruction. According to
the court, a ditch becomes an obstruction only if it renders the
highway less safe, useful, or convenient for the public. This is a
question of fact to be determined by a jury.
44
5. Maintenance and Repair
The Highway Code imposes upon the respective highway au-
thorities the duty to construct, maintain, and repair the highways
within the jurisdiction of each authority. 45 The sections imposing the
duty of maintenance and repair do not expressly include drainage
systems, but such systems are included in the definition of "highways"
in the Highway Code. 46 An additional section lists the procedural
steps for compelling highway commissioners to make road repairs. 47
It is not clear whether these sections require the highway authority
to maintain and repair drainage systems along the highway in two
instances: when adjoining owners have connected a highway ditch
under section 9-107 of the Highway Code48 and when the adjoining
landowners have constructed private drains with the permission of
the highway authority upon land obtained under eminent domain
provisions. When a drain is connected to an existing highway drain
under section 9-107, the highway is still benefited by it. Thus it is
likely the highway authority will be completely responsible for the
maintenance costs. However, when a landowner retains the fee, obtains
a permit, and constructs a ditch in the highway right-of-way for a
private purpose, it is unlikely that the drain would fall within the
statutory definition of "highway." In the case where the highway is
not benefited by such a drain, the highway authority has no respon-
sibility to maintain and repair it.
There is some question about whether a landowner may enter
onto the highway right-of-way without a permit in order to repair a
drainage system. If the system is for the sole benefit of the landowner,
there may be no Tight to make repairs within the right-of-way.
However, the highway authority maintains the power to grant permits
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for all work within the right-of-way and at its discretion, it may
permit the required maintenance.
49
6. Recording Plats
Whenever a highway is laid out, widened, or altered in accordance
with the Highway Code, the proper highway authority shall cause a
plat to be made and recorded in the office of the recorder of deeds
or in the office of the registrar of titles for the county.
50
The Department of Transportation is authorized to take necessary
actions to prevent injury to landowners by encroachments or by the
erection of structures that may impede or obstruct the natural flow
of streams in any manner. Any person planning to cause an en-
croachment or erect a bridge over a stream that drains one square
mile in an urban area or ten square miles in a rural area must first
file plans, profiles, and specifications with the Department of Trans-
portation.
51 This statute could apply to highway authorities building
retention ponds.
7. Willow Hedges as a Public Nuisance
Where willow hedges or a line of willow trees have been planted
along the margin of a highway, so as to render tiling impracticable,
the highway authority having jurisdiction over such highway may
contract with the owner for their destruction; and they shall be
destroyed before tiling. The planting of such hedges or trees hereafter
on the margin of highways is declared to be a public nuisance.52
8. Lateral Support and Deposit of Spoil
It is unlawful for any person to excavate or remove . . . the lateral
support within a distance of 10 feet plus one and one-half times
the depth of any excavation adjacent to the established right-of-
way of any public highway located outside the corporate limits of
any municipality, except that if any of the excavated materials be
of solid rock, the depth of such solid rock shall not be considered
in computing the limit of excavation from such right-of-way line
of such public highway.
It is unlawful for any person to deposit spoil ... in such a manner
that the toe of such spoil will be nearer than 20 feet to any
established right-of-way of any public highway located outside the
corporate limits of any municipality.
Whenever any person violates . . . the foregoing provisions ... he
shall be guilty of a petty offense.
Where any such violaton occurs along any public highway the proper
highway authority ... is authorized to take the necessary steps as
required by law to enter upon the property where such violation
occurs and backfill . . . the unlawful excavation or remove . . . the
unlawful spoil banks . . . . M
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C. DRAINAGE DISTRICTS
THE ORGANIZATION OF DRAINAGE DISTRICTS IN ILLINOIS IS GOV-
ERNED BY THE DRAINAGE CODE. HIGHWAY AUTHORITIES ARE EX-
EMPTED FROM ASSESSMENT BY DRAINAGE DISTRICTS. IN GENERAL,
DRAINAGE DISTRICTS MAY USE HIGHWAY RIGHTS-OF-WAY, SUBJECT TO
A PERMIT BY THE HIGHWAY AUTHORITY. IN ADDITION, DRAINAGE DIS-
TRICTS MUST COMPENSATE ADJACENT LANDOWNERS WHOSE PROPERTY
RIGHTS ARE INVADED. DRAINAGE DISTRICTS POSSESS THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN AND PROBABLY CAN EXERCISE EMINENT DOMAIN
AGAINST A HIGHWAY AUTHORITY. DRAINAGE IMPROVEMENTS IN
STREAMS DRAINING MORE THAN ONE SQUARE MILE IN URBAN AREAS
OR TEN SQUARE MILES IN RURAL AREAS MAY REQUIRE A PERMIT FROM
THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION.
1. Structure
The organization and operation of drainage districts in Illinois
are governed by the Drainage Code. This code completely revised the
two existing drainage laws, which dated back to 1879 and 1885.
Although most of the reported cases involve interpretations of the
two earlier laws, the provisions of immediate interest to this report
were substantially retained in the new code, and the implications of
the various sections therefore remain unchanged.
It is not the purpose of this report to study the technical aspects
of drainage district organization and operation, but instead to discuss
the relationships and the relative rights aud duties that exist between
the drainage districts and the respective highway authorities. For this
reason all technicalities have been omitted, and only Drainage Code
provisions of either definite or probable application to highways are
included. 54 As a starting point, however, summaries are presented to
indicate generally the basic principles governing drainage districts.
1. Drainage districts are authorized by the General Assembly but are
not specifically created by it. Thus, the legislature creates the
framework for a drainage district and gives it certain powers but
leaves it up to local citizens to determine the need for such a
district.
2. Drainage districts need not follow existing governmental lines for
counties, townships, cities, or property lines but can be created on
the basis of a natural drainage basin or a unified river network.
3. Drainage district^' powers relate solely to drainage and protection
against overflow.
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4. The procedure for organizing and governing the districts is usually
the same, starting with a petition from a certain number of area
residents to the circuit court, a general referendum, appointment
of commissioners or trustees, and so forth.55
5. Drainage districts derive their powers from statute, and these
statutes must be fulfilled to make their organization legal. 56
2. Assessment of a Highway as a Drainage District
Member
As originally enacted, section 5-2 of the Drainage Code specifically
included public highways in the assessments of a drainage district.
57
In 1983, however, section 5-2 was amended to exclude public highways
from assessment:
Commissioners shall proceed to make out their assessment roll of
benefits, damages, and compensation, and they shall include therein
all land . . . within the district other than public highways, streets,
and alleys . . . . ft8
This legislative action leaves no doubt that public highways were
purposely excluded from assessment by drainage districts. Article 9
Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution provides that the property of
state and units of local government can be exempted from taxes by
statute. 59 Thus, despite.the possibility that a highway authority might
benefit from drainage district facilities, the legislature has acted
within its constitutional authority by exempting public highways from
being assessed by a drainage district.
3. Use of Highways by Drainage Districts
Drainage Code section 4-14 reads in part:
The commissioners are empowered to ... use any part of any public
highway for the purposes of work to be done, provided such use
will not permanently destroy or materially impair such public
highway for public use. . . -60
The full extent to which the highway may be used is not clear
from the statute. From the reported cases it appears that the statute
permits cutting across a highway with a drainage district ditch. The
implications of this will be discussed in Chapter IV, "Bridges and
Culverts."
The right to use a public highway may or may not give a drainage
district the right to drain into highway ditches and the right to
construct a drain along the highway right-of-way. No cases interpret
the above statutory language. As discussed earlier, section 9-113 of
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the Highway Code requires permission from the highway authority
before any construction is undertaken within the highway right-of-
way.
61 The drainage district must obtain the permission of the highway
authority and compensate any abutting landowners affected by the
construction:
While it is necessary to secure the consent of the commissioners
of highways to lay within the highway a drain for drainage which
is not primarily or exclusively for the benefit of the highway but
which is for the use of the adjoining lands, the commissioners of
highways do not possess the sole power and authority to grant a
right-of-way for such improvement.
Section 13 of Article 2 of the Constitution [Article 1, Section 15
of the 1970 Constitution] provides that private property shall not
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensa-
tion. . . . The laying of this tile in the public highway was an
additional burden and servitude upon the fee.62
It is not clear how a drainage district may proceed if the highway
authority refuses to permit the use or construction of drains along a
highway. As we will discuss in the next section, a drainage district
may be able to invoke eminent domain to use or construct ditches.
4. Eminent Domain
The Drainage Code states that:
Whenever the commissioners are unable to agree with any land-
owner ... on the amount of compensation to be paid . . . then the
commissioner may . . . acquire any such lands, easements, rights-of-
way, properties, and interest, whether privately owned, publicly
owned, or held for the use of the public, by the exercise of the right
of eminent domain.63
No cases have been found in which a drainage district uses
eminent domain against a highway authority. In Department of Public
Works and Buildings v. Ells64 the Supreme Court of Illinois stated
that a general grant of the powers of eminent domain does not
authorize the condemnation of property already devoted to public
use. However, where the legislature explicitly authorizes condemnation
of property dedicated to a public use, the court indicated that an
eminent domain action would be permitted.66
In a 1976 decision, the Metropolitan Sanitary District was per-
mitted to condemn highway property in order to obtain an easement
of right-of-way for a water main.66 The statutory authority came from
ch. 42, section 337 of the Drainage Code: "[s]uch district shall have
the power so to do and may acquire the necessary right-of-way over
public property or such property held for public use. . . ,"
67 With this
language the court permitted the use of eminent domain against a
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highway authority. It is very similar to that found in section 4-17 of
the Drainage Code discussed above. By analogy it would appear that
a drainage district could successfully pursue eminent domain against
a highway authority.
5. Annexation of Lands to Drainage Districts
Lands lying outside a drainage district may be annexed to the
district in any one of three ways: (1) connection to the drains of a
drainage district, (2) petition by commissioners, and (3) petition by
landowners. The third method of annexation is not often litigated
because it involves the express desire of the owners of land outside
the drainage district. The first and second methods, however, have
been the subject of controversy.
As previously discussed, the 1983 amendment of section 5-2 of
the Drainage Code now exempts public highways from assessment
by a drainage district.68 This fact nullifies the principal reason why
a drainage district would want to annex a highway authority property.
However, because the statutory authority remains, some discussion
of the mechanics of annexation is in order.
Regarding the first method, Drainage Code section 8-2 reads:
Any owner of land which lies outside of a district, subdistrict or
minor subdistrict but within the same natural drainage area, or
involved in the same system of drainage as the lands within the
district . . . may connect his land to any open ditch of the dis-
trict ... or, with the prior consent of the commissioners, to any
covered drain of the district Any connection so made shall be
subject to the conditions of section 12-1. When any such connection
is made, the landowner involved shall be deemed to have consented
to the annexation of such land to the district. . . .ra
Regarding the second method, Drainage Code section 8-3 reads:
When any land lying outside of a district has been connected to a
district drain or has been or will be benefited or protected by any
district work done or ordered to be done, the commissioners may
petition the court to annex such land to the district.70
In summary, section 8-2 states that connection to a drainage
district ditch by an outsider is deemed to be consent for annexation.
Section 8-3 states that when connection or benefit can be shown by
the drainage district, the drainage commissioners may petition the
court for annexation.
When either connection or benefit is shown, the courts do not
hesitate to annex the lands to the drainage district. Courts have held
that a dominant estate may be annexed where the flow from the
estate is directed into an artificial ditch constructed by a drainage
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district. The mere fact that the owner of the dominant estate had a
legal right to permit his or her waters to flow to the servient estate
did not allow him or her to escape liability for connecting to the
district's artificial drains. 71
On the other hand, where the drainage district has not benefited
the land and where no connection has been made, the courts just as
readily refuse to annex the lands. Flow resulting from the natural
course of drainage will not subject land to annexation. The connection
must be through some form of artificial ditch or tile.
72
An interesting problem that the courts may soon face is the right
of a highway authority to increase the burden it places upon a
drainage district that can no longer assess the highway authority. 73
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Templeton u. Huss, a
highway authority may be justified in increasing the natural outflow
due to reasonable development. Should the burden the highway
authority places upon the district become unreasonable, the drainage
district may look for damages under the principles of the natural
drainage law discussed in Chapter II.
6. Miscellaneous Provisions
a. Rights of landowners within a district. Two sections of
the Drainage Code deal with the rights of landowners within the
district, that is, district members. Section 12-1 grants the right to
use district drains:
A landowner within any drainage district has the right to use the
ditches and drains of the district as outlets for any drain, either
open or covered, which he may desire to construct for the more
complete drainage of his own land. . . ,
75
Section 12-2 76 is the result of a 1943 case that held that landowners
within a drainage district relinquished some of their common law
rights. In that case the court said that parties who unite to form a
drainage district agree to adopt the drainage system provided by
statute in lieu of the rights of common law.
77 To change this result,
section 12-2 provides:
Land included within a district shall continue to have the same
rights of drainage, both common law and statutory, as land not
within an organized drainage district, except insofar as the drainage
system of the district may vary from or be inconsistent with natural
drainage. The construction of a covered drain by a drainage district
in the course of natural drainage or along the course of an open
ditch shall not in itself be considered to be an abandonment of the
natural drain or the open ditch.
"
b. Landowners' use of the right-of-way. Drainage Code
section 12-3 reads:
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The owner of any land over, through, or across which a district has
acquired a right-of-way . . . may use the land occupied by such right-
of-way in any manner not inconsistent with the paramount easement
of the district. Any use of the right-of-way which will interfere with
the operation of the drain or will increase the cost to the district
of performing any of its work thereon is deemed to be inconsistent
with the district's easement. 79
c. Penalties. Additional Drainage Code sections provide pen-
alties for: (1) injuring a drain, drainage structure, levee, or pumping
plant;
80
(2) preventing entry by commissioners upon lands or rights-
of-way;
81 and (3) preventing construction or repair of private drains.
82
d. State permits. Any work in a stream draining more than
one square mile in urban areas or ten square miles in rural areas
requires a permit from the Department of Transportation.
83
e. Cooperation and agreements with other districts and
agencies. The Department of Transportation is authorized to enter
into agreements with drainage districts and proper agencies to ac-
complish any of the purposes authorized in the Drainage Code. Such
agreements shall cover contributions between the districts and agen-
cies in executing the agreed work.
84
D. INDIVIDUAL LANDOWNERS
INDIVIDUAL LANDOWNERS MAY CONTRACT WITH A HIGHWAY AU-
THORITY TO HAVE THE AUTHORITY CONSTRUCT A DRAINAGE TILE IN
THE HIGHWAY TO ACCOMMODATE THE LANDOWNERS' DRAINAGE IN
ADDITION TO THAT OF THE HIGHWAY. AN INDIVIDUAL MAY OBTAIN
PERMISSION TO OPERATE A DRAIN IN A HIGHWAY AUTHORITY'S RIGHT-
OF-WAY. INJURING OR OBSTRUCTING HIGHWAYS is PROHIBITED WITH-
OUT AUTHORITY APPROVAL.
These subjects are substantially the same as those covered under
"Highway Authorities" on page 28. This section views the subjects
from the standpoint of the individual landowner, while the prior
section took the standpoint of the highway authority with a full
discussion of the statutory provisions.
1. Contracts with Highway Authorities
An adjoining landowner may contract with the highway authority
so the authority will lay a larger drain tile than is necessary for the
highway, thus allowing the landowner to connect to it.85 The landowner
must pay for the enlargement of the tile drain since it will carry off
water from his or her land.86 The landowner may or may not be liable
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for an appropriate share of maintenance costs. Contracts other than
on this issue between the highway authority and an adjoining land-
owner were dicussed earlier and are not included here.
2. Drainage into a Highway with Permission
A landowner through or along whose land a public highway passes
and who desires to drain into the highway may do so if due notice
is first given to the proper highway authority. Written permission
must come from the authority for any work, ditching, or excavating
within the limits of the highway.
87 Section 9-113 of the Highway
Code88 provides that a highway authority may consent to the use of
a highway for an individual's drainage purposes. The individual must,
however, secure the permission of contiguous landowners whose
property is affected.
3. Injuring or Obstructing Highways
Highway Code section 9-11789 provides for a penalty for any
person who injures or obstructs a highway. However, if an adjoining
landowner constructs a ditch in the highway without permission, the
consequences are not clear. The act of construction alone may be
considered an obstruction, and the landowner may be subjected to a
penalty under the Highway Code.90 On the other hand, the ditch may
be considered an obstruction only if it renders the highway less safe,
useful, and convenient to the public.91
Section 9-117 of the code also permits an adjoining landowner to
commit certain acts without subjecting him or herself to the penalty
for obstruction. The landowner may:
1. Drain into a ditch located across or along the highway following
the course of natural drainage.
92
2. Drain into a highway passing through or along his or her land if
permission has been secured.
93
4. Cutting or Damaging State Highways
No person may damage a highway under the authority of the
Department of Transportation without a permit from the Department.
Should a party engage in any activity damaging a highway, the person
who obtained the permit must restore the highway to its original
condition.94
5. Lateral Support and Deposit of Spoil
A landowner may not remove the lateral support within certain
specified distances of the highway: ten feet plus one and one-half
44 CHAPTER THREE
times the depth of excavation. Nor may he or she place the spoil of
any excavation within twenty feet of the highway right-of-way.
95
6. Recording Tile Drains
Under section 2-13 of the Drainage Code, a county with 250,000
or more residents may require a person for whom a tile drain was
installed to record a diagram of it with the county recorder. The
diagram must indicate the location, size, and approximate depth of
the tile.96 While this statute clearly applies to individual landowners,
a highway authority may not have to comply. A narrow reading of
the word "person" in the statutory language may exclude a quasi-
corporation such as a highway authority.
E. EXTENSION OF COVERED DRAINS THROUGH
OTHERS' LAND
THE DRAINAGE CODE AUTHORIZES AN INDIVIDUAL LANDOWNER TO
EXTEND A TILE THROUGH THE LAND OF ANOTHER LANDOWNER. HOW-
EVER, THIS PROVISION MAY NOT BE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE
CURRENT ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION.
1. Statutory Provisions
Sections 2-2 through 2-7 of the Drainage Code read:
a. Extension of covered drains through others' land. When
it is necessary for the owner of land which may be drained by a
covered drain to extend such drain through the land of others in
the general course of natural drainage in order to obtain a proper
outlet and the owner of, or other party interested in, the land
through which such extension is necessary refuses to consent to
the extension
....
the person desiring to construct the drain may
file suit in the circuit court in the county in which such land lies
against the owner . . . and summons shall issue . . . and proceedings
shall be had thereon as in other civil actions in county courts.
97
b. Bond. At the time of commencing the action, the plaintiff shall
file a bond in the penal sum of not less than $100 . . . conditioned
upon the payment of all costs accruing in the action and ... all
damages which may be awarded to the defendant.98
c. Plat and profile. At the time of commencing the action, the
plaintiff shall also file a map or plat showing the land proposed to
be drained, the land across which the drain is proposed to be
constructed and the starting point, route, and outlet of the proposed
drain and a profile showing the elevation of the flow line of the
proposed drain and the elevation of the surface of the ground
through which the drain is proposed to be constructed.99
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d. Trial, finding of verdict, and judgment. If on the trial of
the case, it is found that the proposed drain will be of ample
capacity, will not materially damage the land of the defendant, and
will empty into (a) a natural watercourse, (b) an artificial drain
along a public highway, with the consent of the highway authorities,
or (c) any other outlet which the plaintiff has the right to use, then
the finding or verdict shall be for the plaintiff; and the defendants
shall be allowed such actual damages only as will be sustained by
entering upon the land and constructing the drain and thereafter
keeping the same in repair. If it is not so found, then the finding
or verdict of the jury shall be for the defendant . . . . Ul
e. Abandonment of proceedings. If, after obtaining such a
judgment, the plaintiff elects ... to abandon the proceedings, the
court shall note such voluntary abandonment upon the docket. If
the plaintiff fails to construct the drain within 2 years after obtaining
such a judgment, the court, on motion of the defendant . . . shall
note the failure to construct and resulting abandonment .... If the
plaintiff abandons the proceedings, either voluntarily or by failure
to construct the drain as set forth above, he shall not be permitted
to commence another action against the defendant for the same
purpose until after the expiration of 5 years from the rendition of
the judgment. 101
2. Constitutionality
Drainage Code sections 2-2 through 2-7 authorize the passing of
a tile through the land of another. But they may not be constitutional
under the 1970 Illinois State Constitution. 102 The 1870 Constitution,
which was in force when these statutes were enacted, contained the
following clause: "The General Assembly may pass laws permitting
the owners of lands to construct drains, ditches, and levees for
agricultural, sanitary, or mining purposes, across the lands of oth-
ers ...
" lo:' The 1970 Constitution lacks this saving clause. For this
reason a court would likely regard the statute as authorizing a private
right of eminent domain. Such a private right is probably a violation
of the due process clause
104
of the Illinois Constitution. 10 '' However,
no decision has invalidated these provisions of the Drainage Code.
3. Bond and Plat
The plaintiff is required to file both a penal bond 106 and a plat 107
of the land to be drained and the land across which the drain is to
be constructed. In the leading case, the transcript from the justice of
the peace noted that the bond had been properly submitted. This
recital, in the absence, of any evidence to impeach it, was considered
to comply with the statute. In addition, a crude and imperfect sketch
of the land to be drained had been submitted to fulfill the plat
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requirement. The court held that this imperfect sketch was a sufficient
attempt to comply with the statute.
108
4. Applicability
An individual may clearly be the plaintiff. But it is not clear
whether the statute is restricted to use by individuals. The term
"person" used in section 2-2,
109 if narrowly interpreted, may exclude
such quasi-corporations as the highway authority. Furthermore, a
highway authority would not likely be permitted to use this provision
because it can use the right of eminent domain through the Highway
Code.
The statute probably expects that the defendant will be an
individual landowner. Nevertheless, could the highway authority ever
be in that position? A landowner would not likely seek a judicial
order to allow him or her to construct a covered drain beneath a
highway, since the statute itself requires the highway authority's
consent to connect to an artificial ditch along a public highway.
110
Once an authority refuses to grant permission, the court must honor
the authority's discretion.
The wording of the statute does not outline the circumstances
under which it may be used. First, its provisions are limited to
situations where "it is necessary" to extend the drain. "Necessity" is
not defined. Second, the drain must be "in the general course of
natural drainage." The requirements of this clause are also left
undefined.
F. DRAINS AND LEVEES FOR MUTUAL BENEFIT
THE DRAINAGE CODE PERMITS THE FORMATION OF MUTUAL DRAIN-
AGE SYSTEMS. HOWEVER, BECAUSE HIGHWAY AUTHORITIES MAY NOT
BE ASSESSED AS MEMBERS OF A MUTUAL DRAINAGE SYSTEM, THESE
PROVISIONS APPLY ONLY BETWEEN PRIVATE LANDOWNERS AS A PRAC-
TICAL MATTER.
1. Purpose
Sections 2-8 through 2-11
111
of the Illinois Drainage Code address
the subject of drains and levees for the benefit of the members of a
mutual drainage system. The purpose of these sections has been
stated repeatedly by the courts:
The statute referred to does not restrict or abridge the rights of
drainage as they existed at common law. Its sole purpose and effect
is to enlarge those rights.
112
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That act was intended to enlarge the rights of drainage as between
adjoining land holders and to protect drains continuous in their
character and purpose for the mutual benefit of the land affected
whenever they had been constructed by license or consent, though
without written authority.
113
These broad statements must be limited in at least one respect:
when a mutual drainage system exists, a landowner may be restricted
in the full use of his or her common law rights. In a 1907 appellate
case, a landowner who was a member of a mutual drainage system
attempted to use the common law right of the dominant owner to
collect the surface water on his own land artificially and discharge it
on the servient owner at the point of natural entry. In artificially
collecting the water, the landowner cut across several tiles of the
mutual system, preventing water from flowing normally through the
tiles. In holding that this normally permissible improvement on one's
own land was not permissible under these circumstances, the court
said:
[H]e has no right in doing so to disturb in any way the flow of
water which would pass off his premises through an outlet provided
by a mutual system of drainage."
4
2. Parties
While the statute speaks in general terms of "owners of lands,"
court decisions have determined which landowners may become parties
to a mutual drainage system. Clearly an individual landowner is
included within the statute. Just as clearly, a drainage district is
excluded:
[T]he act was not designed and did not have any operation upon
a drainage district or the ditches or drains therein. . . . The act of
1889 relates only to private and individual rights in ditches or
drains constructed by mutual license, consent or agreement, and
has no reference to the ditches or drains of an organized drainage
district." 5
The act has been applied to highway authorities on the assumption
that they may become members of a mutual drainage system. Once
a member, however, the highway authority may or may not be bound
in the same manner as an individual. One case indicates that the
highway is similarly bound:
[T]he highway commissioners of the town of Oakwood have con-
sented to the laying of this drain in the highway, and . . . they are
bound thereby. Appellee is, therefore, protected in his right to drain
the land through- this small drain as it is now relocated in the
highway. . . . Neither the public, through the highway commission-
ers, nor any private individual can interfere with this right."
6
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Another case, however, seems to indicate that the highway au-
thority, although a member of a mutual drainage system, may change
a system that an individual member would be prohibited from at-
tempting. After finding that a mutual drainage system existed, the
court commented:
Even if public necessity and the security of the highway might
authorize the highway commissioners to make changes, yet that
could not be done till the necessity arose."
7
Another question arises concerning application of the statute to
the highway. The cases in which a highway has been found to be a
member of a mutual drainage system have usually involved situations
where the system carried water away from the highway.
118 There is
at least one case, however, where the reverse was true. 119 The highway
authority had granted permission to an adjoining landowner to connect
with and discharge into the highway drain under the predecessor to
Highway Code section 9-107. 120 The court found that mutual benefit
existed and that a mutual drainage system had been established. The
question raised is this: pursuant to Highway Code section 9-107, when
the highway authority grants permission to an adjoining landowner
to connect with the highway drain and when the connection benefits
the highway, does a mutual system exist?
A third point concerning a highway authority's membership in a
mutual drainage system involves the fact that a record is usually
required as evidence of any official act of the highway authority. 121
The subject of mutual drains, however, is an exception to this
requirement. When a party contested the fact that a mutual drainage
system was not mentioned in the record of the acts of the highway
authority, the court held:
It is true, the commissioners act by virtue of their corporate
authority, and their acts, in most instances, can be proved only by
the record, but the act here under consideration was not required
to be made a matter of record to render it valid. 122
Finally, when a highway authority is found to be a member of a
mutual drainage system, there appears to be no way to assess the
highway authority. Section 3-27 of the Drainage Code provides that
a continuing line of drainage constructed voluntarily by two or more
parties will obligate the lands connected by the system for a just
proportion of the costs. Furthermore, if the parties are unable to
provide for repairs and the apportionment of costs, the landowners
may petition to form a drainage district. 123 However, as discussed
earlier,
124
section 5-2 of the Drainage Code explicitly exempts public
highways from assessment. 125 It therefore appears that a highway
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authority can be compelled to join a mutual drainage system, but
there may be no way to apportion costs to the authority.
Because a highway authority cannot be assessed as a member of
a mutual drainage system, further discussion of these sections is not
relevant to this report. First, a highway authority would not have to
enter voluntarily into a mutual drainage district because it can alter
drainage by the power of eminent domain. Second, an individual
landowner would not likely want to compel a highway authority to
join a mutual district if it cannot be assessed. The Highway Code
and the regulations promulgated under it permit entry into the
highway right-of-way in order to maintain ditches. 126 The code also
empowers the highway authority to permit private landowners to
drain into highway ditches for limited terms. These provisions dispel
any reason for a private landowner to compel a highway authority to
join a mutual drainage system. Therefore, following the 1983 revision
of section 5-2 of the Highway Code, any application of these sections
to a highway authority is insignificant.
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CHAPTER IV: BRIDGES AND
CULVERTS
A. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE
This section addresses principal issues involving bridges and
culverts. Who pays for construction, who is responsible for mainte-
nance, who is liable for faulty construction and maintenance, and
what is required to secure a construction permit from the Department
of Transportation are all considered. Insight will come from relevant
statutory, common law, and regulatory sources.
As we will show below, the legislature has explicitly stated who
must pay for both construction and maintenance of bridges and
culverts in most rural areas. Section 12-4 of the Drainage Code
dictates that the highway authority is responsible for the construction
and maintenance of any bridge or culvert crossing a natural channel,
and the drainage district is responsible for the construction and
maintenance of a bridge or culvert required for a new channel to
cross an existing highway.' In urban areas, the law is more complex.
2
B. CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE IN
RURAL AREAS
WHEN A HIGHWAY CROSSES A NATURAL DRAIN OR A DITCH CON-
STRUCTED IN THE COURSE OF NATURAL DRAINAGE, THE HIGHWAY
AUTHORITY MUST CONSTRUCT AND MAINTAIN A BRIDGE OR CULVERT
WITH SUFFICIENT CAPACITY TO SERVE THE DRAINAGE NEEDS OF THE
PUBLIC FOR ALL FUTURE TIME. HOWEVER, IF A DRAINAGE DISTRICT
INCREASES THE CAPACITY OF THE NATURAL DRAIN OR DITCH OR
CHANGES ITS ALIGNMENT AND THIS ACTION THREATENS THE BRIDGE
CROSSING THE IMPROVED NATURAL DRAIN OR DITCH, THE DRAINAGE
DISTRICT IS LIABLE TO THE HIGHWAY AUTHORITY FOR THE COST OF
PROTECTING THE BRIDGE. WHEN A DRAINAGE DISTRICT DRAIN CROSSES
AN EXISTING HIGHWAY OTHER THAN IN THE COURSE OF NATURAL
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DRAINAGE, THE DRAINAGE DISTRICT IS LIABLE FOR THE CONSTRUC-
TION, REPAIR, AND MAINTENANCE COSTS.
1. Provisions Prior to Enactment of the Drainage
Code
The Farm Drainage Act of 18853 made highway authorities liable
for all costs incurred in the construction of bridges or culverts required
to preserve roadways.
4 A 1907 decision declared this act unconstitu-
tional because it enabled the authority of one local government to
impose a debt on the residents of a municipal corporation without
its consent.5 Subsequent cases maintained a distinction between
natural and artificial ditches, making a drainage district liable for
the costs of a bridge or culvert crossing an artificial ditch.
6
Finally,
in People ex rel. Burow u. Block, the Illinois Supreme Court removed
any distinction between natural and artificial ditches. The court
declared it unconstitutional to require the highway authority to pay
to replace a bridge that is part of an existing highway when the bridge
is removed by a drainage district.
7
2. Provisions Contained in the Drainage Code
Whether the drain or ditch does or does not lie in the course of
natural drainage remains an important consideration under contem-
porary Illinois statutes. Section 12-4 of the 1955 Drainage Code, as
amended in 1967, outlines the responsibility for the construction and
rebuilding of bridges across artificial and natural watercourses. This
section provides:
Whenever a drainage district drain crosses an existing air-strip
or airplane landing field ... or an existing public highway or an
existing railroad other than in the course of natural drainage, the
drainage district is liable to the highway authority or the railroad,
or the political subdivision or municipality which owns the air-
strip or airplane landing field, for the cost of constructing any
bridge or culvert made necessary by such crossing and shall there-
after be liable to the highway authority or railroad, or the political
subdivision or municipality which owns the air-strip or airplane
landing field, for the cost of repairing and maintaining such a bridge
or culvert.
Whenever a natural drain or a ditch constructed in the course
of natural drainage crosses a public highway or a railroad, or an
air-strip or airplane landing field, the highway authority or the
railroad, or the political subdivision or municipality which owns
the air-strip or airplane landing field, shall construct and thereafter
keep in repair and maintain a bridge or culvert of sufficient length,
depth, height above the bed of the drain or ditch, and capacity to
subserve the needs of the public with respect to the drainage of the
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lands within the natural watershed of such drain or ditch, not only
as such needs exist at the time of construction, but for all future
time
If a drainage district by deepening, widening or straightening a
natural drain or by changing the established grade, width, or
alignment of a ditch, removes or threatens to remove the support
from under any abutment, pier, wingwall or other supporting member
of a highway or railroad bridge, or an air-strip or airplane landing
field, the drainage district is liable to the highway authority or
railroad, or the political subdivision or municipality which owns
the air-strip or airplane landing field, for the cost of protecting or
underpinning such abutment, pier, wingwall or other supporting
member. The amount of such liability may be fixed and determined
by agreement between the drainage commissioners and the highway
authority or railroad, or the political subdivision or municipality
which owns the air-strip or airplane landing field, or by the allowance
of damages in the assessment proceeding or, if there is no assessment
proceeding, then by separate action at law. Nothing contained in
this paragraph shall be construed as relieving the highway authority
or railroad, or the political subdivision or municipality which owns
the air-strip or airplane landing field, from its obligation to construct
and maintain adequate bridges or culverts over natural drains or
over ditches constructed in the course of natural drainage herein -
above provided in the second paragraph of this section.
8
Where highways cross drains constructed in the course of natural
drainage, the statute is similar to the Farm Drainage Act and Levee
Act, even though those acts were declared unconstitutional in certain
circumstances. The code specifically states that any highway authority
generally must construct and maintain bridges whenever a natural
drain or a ditch constructed in the original natural drainage crosses
a public highway.
No cases decided under section 12-4 specifically address the duty
of the highway authority to restore a bridge over a natural watercourse
when a drainage district has removed or destroyed it in the course
of its work. A statutory interpretation suggests that the drainage
district is responsible: the language of the first sentence of section
12-4 eliminates the constitutional objections found in earlier cases
by making the district responsible for restoring a bridge when it has
made such construction necessary. An interpretation suggesting high-
way authority responsibility is contained in the second paragraph: it
requires the highway authority to anticipate drainage needs in a
particular area "for all time" and to construct its bridges according
to those needs. For reasons described below, this second interpretation
is preferred.
Support for this interpretation is found in the natural drainage
law as modified by Templeton v. Huss.
9
Templeton permits the dom-
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inant landowner to increase drainage beyond the natural flow, provided
the increase is necessary for the reasonable development of the
landowner's property. It is, therefore, appropriate to require the
highway authority to construct a bridge or culvert of sufficient capacity
to accommodate such increased drainage within a basin. While there
are no cases on point involving a highway, the case of Kankakee &
Seneca R. R. Co. u. Horan 10 involved a railroad that constructed a
culvert of insufficient size. The court decided that in building a
culvert, the railroad was bound to anticipate and provide for any
legal increase in the flows.
It is also logical to require a highway authority to design a bridge
to accommodate future volumes of flow and at the same time to
require the drainage district to protect the abutments and other
supporting structures. In building a bridge, the engineers must design
the supporting structures in accordance with flow velocities, quantities,
flow line, and other design criteria. This site-specific design is nec-
essary to avoid excessive erosion of the banks and foundation of the
abutments. Perhaps it is a reasonable compromise to compel the
highway authority to design the bridges and culverts for adequate
quantity and to require the drainage district to protect the supporting
members if they decide to alter the flow line.
3. Maintenance Prior to Enactment of the Drainage
Code
The Illinois courts developed the general rule that the highway
authority is responsible for the maintenance of bridges or culverts if
the damage to them is a result of public use. 11 The rationale of the
Illinois Supreme Court was that the state Constitution prevents
drainage commissioners from levying taxes to fulfill an obligation of
the highway districts. 12 Implicit in several cases 13 and emphasized in
the background discussion contained in one of them 14 is the rule that
if the damage is caused by the work of the drainage commissioners,
they will be responsible for the necessary repairs.
4. Maintenance Under the Drainage Code
The Drainage Code states that the drainage commissioners must
pay for maintaining highway bridges spanning ditches not in the
course of natural drainage: "Whenever a drainage district drain
crosses ... an existing public highway . . . other than in the course of
natural drainage, the drainage district is liable to the highway au-
thority ... for the cost of repairing and maintaining such a bridge or
culvert." 15 No decisions have been reported under this provision. The
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act is apparently prospective in nature,
16
suggesting that bridges that
do not span the course of natural drainage and were constructed prior
to January 1, 1956, would be maintained pursuant to the rule as it
was developed by the courts.
As to the maintenance and repair of bridges aud culverts con-
structed in the course of natural drainage, the new statute dictates
that the obligation will remain with the highway authority. Even
despite an agreement between a highway authority and a drainage
district that the drainage district will be responsible for repairs, the
authority will be liable for the maintenance of a bridge over a natural
watercourse. In a case involving a sanitary district, the Illinois
Supreme Court concluded that a contract by ordinance that circum-
vents the common law and infringes upon the spirit of state law is
invalid and unenforceable. 17 Where such an agreement conflicts with
state law, the state law prevails.
C. CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE IN
URBAN AREAS
IN URBAN AREAS, THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY FOR COSTS OF CON-
STRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE FOCUSES UPON MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS INSTEAD OF DRAINAGE DISTRICTS EXERCISING STORM DRAINAGE
POWERS. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS MUST PAY FOR CONSTRUCTION OF
BRIDGES OVER ARTIFICIAL CHANNELS AND FOR REPLACING BRIDGES
DESTROYED BY DEEPENING OR WIDENING NATURAL CHANNELS. EITHER
THE HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OR THE MUNICIPALITY WITHIN WHOSE JU-
RISDICTION THE STREET OR HIGHWAY LIES IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAIN-
TENANCE.
In urban areas, responsibility for bridge construction and main-
tenance is shifted from the highway authorities and drainage districts
to highway authorities and municipal corporations exercising storm
drainage powers. While drainage districts are created to serve agri-
cultural purposes, urban areas are better served by municipalities or
special districts for storm drainage and sanitation.
18 Five separate
acts authorize the establishment of sanitary districts: the Sanitary
Districts Act of 1907,
19 the North Shore Sanitary District Act,
20 the
Sanitary District Act of 1917,
21 the Sanitary District Act of 1936,
22
and the Chicago Sanitary District Act.
23
D. PRIVATE BRIDGES AND CULVERTS
WHEN OPEN DRAINS CONSTRUCTED BY DRAINAGE DISTRICTS CUT
OFF PRIVATE LANDS FROM PUBLIC HIGHWAYS, THE DRAINAGE DISTRICT
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MUST PROVIDE ACCESS ACROSS THE DITCH OR, IN SOME CASES, COM-
PENSATE THE LANDOWNER FOR CONSTRUCTION OF A BRIDGE OR CUL-
VERT. WHERE NEW HIGHWAY DITCHES CONSTRUCTED ALONGSIDE A
HIGHWAY AS PART OF THE HIGHWAY DRAINAGE SYSTEM DEPRIVE AN
ADJACENT LANDOWNER OF ACCESS TO THE HIGHWAY, THE HIGHWAY
AUTHORITY MUST INSTALL ADEQUATE CULVERTS OR OTHER CROSSINGS.
Whenever an open drain "crosses any [privately owned] enclosed
tract or parcel of land in such a manner that a portion thereof is
landlocked and has no access from any public highway other than by
a bridge or passageway over the ditch,"
24 the primary responsibility
to provide access rests with the drainage district. That duty was
imposed by the Farm Drainage Act of 1885. Although it has not been
altered since, the procedure has changed. Depending upon when the
ditch was constructed, when the district was organized, and whether
the ditch is part of a natural drain, a bridge may be constructed or
the landowner may be compensated for the cost of construction.
25
The district must realize that the duty to construct a bridge or culvert
extends beyond the initial construction. When an existing ditch is
deepened or widened and a new bridge or culvert becomes necessary,
the district is also responsible for the cost.
26
Highway authorities must restore a landowner's access to a public
highway when the highway authority constructs a ditch destroying
the access. Section 9-105 of the Highway Code provides in part:
In constructing a public highway, if a ditch is made at the junction
of highways, or at the entrance of gates or other openings of
adjoining premises, the highway authorities shall construct good
and sufficient culverts or other convenient crossings.27
Only one case has been decided on this point. In Taylor v. Reed28
the court enforced the dictate of the statute and ordered the highway
commissioners to construct culverts wherever highway drains had
deprived the plaintiff of his usual access. It should be noted, however,
that a court will probably require a drainage district to build culverts
if it built the drains along the highway.
29
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CHAPTER V: DRAINAGE
AND THE ENVIRONMENT
A. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE
Until the late 1960s highway authorities and private landowners
encountered few environmental constraints in their pursuit of im-
proved drainage. Both parties were essentially free to pass runoff
onto servient estates without concern for any effects on quality. It
was only when poor water quality unreasonably affected the servient
owners' use and enjoyment of their lands that the common law
nuisance action became available to the servient owners. While much
legislation now covers polluted drainage waters, the traditional nuis-
ance action remains the primary method for aggrieved landowners to
affect a remedy. As a result, this private action will be discussed in
some length.
The environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s led to an
explosion of federal legislation to improve the quality of the environ-
ment. The Clean Water Act of 1977 and the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 are the most important pieces of federal environ-
mental legislation affecting highway drainage. When, how, and to
whom these acts apply will be addressed. In addition, other federal
legislation that may affect highway drainage will be examined. The
Illinois General Assembly has not legislated extensively in the areas
of highway drainage and the environment, but relevant legislation
and agency regulations will be reviewed.
Compliance with environmental legislation is not discussed in
detail in this chapter. Rather, the aim is to make highway authorities
aware of the environmental laws that may affect highway drainage
and to direct authorities to the proper provisions.
B. NUISANCE
LANDOWNERS MAY BRING PRIVATE NUISANCE ACTIONS WHEN THEY
SUFFER AN UNREASONABLE INVASION OF THE USE AND ENJOYMENT OF
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THEIR PROPERTY. PUBLIC NUISANCE ACTIONS MAY BE BROUGHT BY A
PUBLIC OFFICIAL AGAINST ANY ACTION THAT THREATENS THE PUBLIC
HEALTH, SAFETY, OR WELFARE. FEDERAL WATER QUALITY LEGISLATION
HAS CREATED A STATUTORY NUISANCE ACTION THAT MAY BE MORE FAR-
REACHING THAN COMMON LAW NUISANCE ACTIONS. WHERE A NUIS-
ANCE IS FOUND TO EXIST, THE COURT MAY ENJOIN THE CONDUCT
CREATING THE NUISANCE, OR IT MAY REQUIRE THE PARTY CREATING
THE NUISANCE TO PAY DAMAGES.
Wherever there is natural or artificial drainage or water collected
for any purpose, problems of contamination and pollution may arise.
Until the passage of legislation in the late 1960s, the common law
nuisance action was a landowner's only remedy for interference in
the use and enjoyment of the land. Despite today's wide variety of
water pollution control legislation, including statutory nuisance, it is
generally limited to controlling point sources.
1
Thus, the common law
nuisance action is still important.
1. Common Law Nuisance
A nuisance may be defined as an action that unreasonably
interferes with the rights of others to enjoy their property. The
perpetrator of the nuisance is normally subject to court injunction
requiring abatement of the nuisance. Any harmed party may request
this type of remedy. An individual or a public official may seek relief
in the courts, but the relief is granted subject to different consider-
ations, depending upon whether the nuisance is private or public.
a. Private nuisance. A private nuisance is a nontrespatory
invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of his or her
land. 2 The threshold question in a private nuisance case is whether
some property right held by the plaintiff is abridged.
3 The wrong
must arise from unreasonable, unwarranted, or unlawful use of the
defendant's property that produces such material annoyance, incon-
venience, discomfort, or hurt that the law will presume consequent
damage. 4 Unreasonable use of one's property is determined by bal-
ancing the following factors according to the facts of each individual
case:
1. The extent of the harm involved;
2. The character of the harm involved;
3. The social value that the law attaches to the type of use or
enjoyment invaded;
4. The suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the
character of the locality; and
5. The burden on the person harmed to avoid the harm. 5
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The injury must be substantial with no other adequate remedy
available at law. A court will not take cognizance of mere annoyances,6
nor will it intervene where the harm is doubtful. 7 To constitute a
prospective nuisance, a substantial invasion of the plaintiff's property
must at least be threatened. That is, an injunction will be issued only
where it is
"highly probable" that an activity will lead to a nuisance.
8
If the above requirements are present, a private person may sue
to enjoin a nuisance created by a governmental authority. Illinois
courts have restrained a town from discharging sewage onto a farmer's
land9 and awarded damages when a city altered the drainage of a
street to flow onto a plaintiff's land.
10
Thus, if a highway authority
allowed a drain to become clogged, turn stagnant, and emit foul odors
that hampered a landowner in the use of his or her property, a court
could order the authority to abate the condition.
b. Public nuisance. An action to enjoin a nuisance may be
brought by a public official when the damage or threat of damage is
to the public health, safety, or welfare. Such actions are instituted
for the general benefit of a community, and private property rights
need not be involved. 11
In Kenilworth Sanitarium v. Village of Kenilworth
12 the plaintiff
village sought an injunction to prevent the sanitarium from emptying
its sewage into a drainage ditch that flowed into the municipal water
supply. The threat of disease forced the court to order an injunction.
The court stated that a watercourse used solely to drain away surface
waters cannot be changed into a sewer without the consent of all the
servient owners. Even if the servient owners should consent, equitable
jurisdiction would be granted if there was an ensuing threat to the
public health.
The language of the court in Stead v. Partner states the law of
public nuisance quite explicitly:
The public authorities have a right to institute the suit where the
general public welfare demands it. ... The maintenance of the public
health, morals, safety and welfare is on a plane above mere pecuniary
damage . . . and to say that a court of equity may not enjoin a
public nuisance because property rights are not involved would be
to say that the State is unable to enforce the law or protect its
citizens from public wrongs.
13
Stead us. Partner arose from the operation of several unlicensed
taverns in the town of Shelbyville, where an unlicensed dram shop
was statutorily defined as a public nuisance.
14 Such a definition
removes the plaintiff's burden of proof. When a condition is statutorily
defined as a public nuisance, an injunction can be obtained if the
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alleged offense simply comes within the terms of the statute. Con-
sequently, certain acts of pollution declared public nuisances under
section 221(2) of the Nuisance Code 15 do not require a showing of
harm. The section reads: "It is a public nuisance: . . . [t]o throw or
deposit any offal or other offensive matter, or the carcass of any dead
animal in any watercourse, lake, pond, spring, well, or common sewer,
street, or public highway." In addition to imposing criminal liability,
the language would probably subject a person to an injunction for
intentional acts such as draining toilets into a public storm sewer or
piping barnyard wastes directly into a highway drain. The acts
committed must be shown to be of the type that the legislature
defined; once that is accomplished, an injunction would be appropriate.
The magnitude of injury is the key factor in requests for court
intervention. Unless section 165(2) of the Nuisance Code can be
applied to the situation, the pollution must be sufficient to harm or
threaten to harm a private individual's use and enjoyment of his or
her property. In the case of a public nuisance, it must be serious
enough to threaten the general public health, safety, or welfare.
2. Statutory Nuisance
The nuisance laws are in many ways incorporated into the Illinois
Environmental Protection Act, 16 which grants remedies that are based
upon or virtually identical to traditional nuisance theory.
17 The Act
provides in section 12(a) that no person shall do anything that tends
to "cause water pollution in Illinois" or "violate regulations or
standards adopted."
18 The statutory nuisance is found in the first
segment of the provision. Section 3(nn) of the Act defines water
pollution as "... likely to create a nuisance or render such waters
harmful or detrimental or injurious to public health, safety, or wel-
fare . . . ." 19 The reference to nuisance in sections 3(nn) and 12(a)
makes a statutory action possible against the discharge of all polluted
water, and this action exists whether or not the discharge complies
with the Pollution Control Board's regulations.
20 Section 49(e) makes
it clear that compliance with the regulations is only a prima facie
defense to an action and does not preclude a possible common law
nuisance action.21
As we will show, this statutory nuisance action is subject to the
limitations of the Clean Water Act. That is, the source of the pollution
must be a point-source discharge into the waters of the State of
Illinois.22 Thus statutory nuisance is a narrower action than common
law private nuisance. On the other hand, it is broader in other ways.
One way in which statutory nuisance is broader is that the scope
of protected interests extends beyond property rights.23 For example,
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Section 11 (a) 24 extends a pollution nuisance action to anything that
"offends the senses," independent of land ownership.
25
Have these statutory provisions become a complete substitute for
court actions based upon common law nuisance? In Wilsonuille u.
SCA Services the Illinois Supreme Court permitted a common law
nuisance action without considering alternative statutory relief.
26 In
contrast, at the federal level, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that
federal common law nuisance was entirely preempted by the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act. 27 As one commentator stated, "Argu-
ments that any state law may be similarly affected are reserved for
speculation." However, the Wilsonuille case would appear to be the
dispositive in Illinois until the U.S. Supreme Court expressly overrules
it. Thus, the common law nuisance action is available in addition to
statutory relief in Illinois.
C. THE FEDERAL CLEAN WATER ACT
THE FEDERAL CLEAN WATER ACT is DESIGNED TO REGULATE ALL
POINT-SOURCE DISCHARGES INTO THE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES.
UNLESS EXEMPTED, A DISCHARGE is REQUIRED TO BE AUTHORIZED BY
A NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM PERMIT.
PERMITS ARE ALSO REQUIRED FOR THE DISCHARGE OF DREDGED AND
FILL MATERIALS INTO THE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ON
WETLANDS.
The goal of the Clean Water Act (CWA) is the preservation of
water quality. The scope of the Act is broadly stated:
Except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316,
1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any
pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.
28
"Person" is defined as "an individual, corporation, partnership, as-
sociation, state, municipality, commission, or political subdivision of
a State or any interstate body."
29 This definition clearly encompasses
highway authorities.
The Act defines "discharge of pollutant" as "any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source."
30 A pollutant
is defined as
"dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage,
garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological ma-
terials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment,
rock, sand, cellar dirt, and industrial, municipal, and agricultural
waste discharged into water."
31 This list encompasses many of the
contaminants associated with highway drainage. Navigable waters
refers to "the waters of the United States, including territorial seas."
32
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For purposes of the Act, this definition includes almost every waterway
into which a discharge occurs.33
Point-source pollution is intended to encompass all concentrated
pollutant sources except those from diffused surface runoff.
34 Point
source is defined as:
any discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance, including but
not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete
fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding oper-
ation M
Only return flow from irrigated agriculture is excluded. From this
definition it appears that unchecked road surface runoff is not covered
under the CWA. However, once the runoff is collected, channelled,
and discharged into navigable water, the CWA does appear to apply.36
For the purpose of highway drainage, two provisions of the Clean
Water Act are of interest. First, section 1342 establishes the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit
requirement
37 and second, section 1344 requires permits for dredge
and fill operations.38
1. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
Permits
NPDES permits are designed to allow point-source discharges
into the "waters of the United States." The permit program is
administered by the United States Environmental Protection Agency,
but the act provides that it can be delegated to a state once the state
promulgates regulatory guidelines.
39 The State of Illinois was delegated
the authority to administer the NPDES permit program through the
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) following the adop-
tion of amendments to the water pollution regulations.40
The threshold question under the guidelines is whether highway
drainage systems constitute a point source of pollution. While there
is no relevant Illinois case law, the statutes indicate that in most
instances drainage systems should be covered by an NPDES permit.
A Washington state court decision supports this conclusion.
In an urban setting, Pederson v. Washington State Department of
Transportation
41 found an NPDES permit was required from the
Washington Department of Ecology when the state highway depart-
ment altered a highway drainage system. In nonurban settings, it is
not clear when a permit will be required. However, in light of the
possible effects of pollution on "the waters of the United States," the
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency should be consulted in most
circumstances.
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United States Environmental Protection Agency regulations em-
power the administrator to issue general permits to cover discharges
corresponding to existing geographic or political areas.
42 State highway
systems are specifically included in the permissible geographic or
political boundaries,
43 and separate storm water point sources are
specifically noted as appropriate general permit holders.
44 In Illinois,
the state Environmental Protection Agency is authorized by the state
legislature to issue general NPDES permits.45 Issuance of a general
permit for nonurban separate storm sewers by the IEPA could ease
the NPDES permit compliance burden for the state highway authority.
2. Permits for Dredged or Fill Material
The CWA describes a pollutant as dredged spoil, solid waste,
biological materials, rock, sand, cellar dirt, and agricultural waste
discharged into water. Thus, virtually any deposition of fill constitutes
a point source of pollution.
46
The CWA authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers to issue permits
for the discharge of dredged and fill materials into the navigable
waters of the United States. 47 Such permits are commonly referred
to as "404 permits" because the Corps' authority is under section 404
of the CWA as codified in 33 U.S.C. 1344.
Section 1344(f)(l) lists activities not subject to the permit re-
quirement, and the focus is primarily on normal agricultural and
silvicultural activities. 48 In addition, the Secretary of the Army may
issue general permits for activities with only minimal individual and
cumulative environmental impacts. These narrowly defined activities
are subject to certain mandatory conditions. 49 Section 1344(f)(2)
demonstrates the sweeping scope of the 404 permit requirement:
Any discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters
incidental to any activity having as its purpose bringing an area of
the navigable waters into a use to which it was not previously
subject, where the flow or circulation of navigable waters may be
impaired or the reach of such waters reduced, shall be required to
have a permit under this section.
50
Corps regulations broadly define the terms "dredged material,"
"discharge of dredged material," "fill material," and "discharge of fill
material."51 Almost as broad as the Corps' regulations defining "dredge"
and "fill" operations are their regulations describing navigable waters
under the CWA [Section 1362(7)]: "the waters of the United States,
including the territorial seas." The Corps regulations expand the
provision to incorporate wetlands.
52
A 1984 Sixth Circuit case sheds light on the current definition
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of wetlands contained in Corps regulations.
53 The case adopts a two-
prong test for a "wetland" based upon the type of vegetation present.
The Corps has established nationwide permits for the discharge
of dredge and fill materials into the following waters:
1. Nontidal rivers, streams, and their lakes and impoundments,
including adjacent wetlands that are located above the headwaters;
and
2. Other nontidal waters of the United States that are not part of a
surface tributary system to interstate waters or navigable waters
of the United States.
The following mandatory conditions must be satisfied when
performing work under the preceding authorizations:
1. The discharge may not be located in the proximity of a public
water supply intake.
2. The discharge may not destroy a threatened or endangered species
as identified by the Endangered Species Act or destroy or adversely
modify the critical habitat of such species.
3. The discharge must consist of suitable materials free from toxic
pollutants in toxic amounts.
4. The fill created by the discharge must be properly maintained to
prevent erosion and other nonpoint sources of pollution.
5. The discharge may not occur in a component of the National Wild
and Scenic River System.
6. The best management practices listed in 33 CFR 306.6 must be
followed to the maximum extent practicable.54
The Federal Highway Administration regulations contain provi-
sions entitled "Erosion and Sediment Control on Highway Projects."55
Their purpose is to prescribe policies and procedures to control erosion,
abate water pollution, and prevent sediment deposition connected
with federally funded highway projects.
56 The regulations dictate that
all reasonable steps should be taken to ensure that the project design
minimizes erosion.57 In particular, the regulations call for the con-
struction and maintenance of permanent erosion and sedimentation
control structures. Futhermore, temporary erosion control devices are
to be employed during construction. Finally, pollutants used during
construction or operation and materials from sediment traps are to
be handled so as to prevent them from being washed into any
watercourse by runoff or high water.58
Sometimes fill activity by adjoining landowners increases the
amount of drainage water reaching a highway. Or the fill alters the
natural drainage pattern, creating an unnatural burden on highway
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drainage systems. When the fill is not on lands considered wetlands
or in waters of the United States, in a public body of water, or in
the floodway of a stream, neither the Corps of Engineers nor the
Illinois Department of Transportation requires a permit. Controver-
sies resulting from this type of fill activity are settled under general
drainage or nuisance principles.
D. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT
UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, FEDERAL
AGENCIES ARE REQUIRED TO PREPARE AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT BEFORE ANY MAJOR ACTION THAT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTS
THE QUALITY OF THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT. THE ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT MUST BE APPROVED BEFORE SIGNIFICANT DESIGN
ACTIVITIES OR PROPERTY ACQUISITIONS OCCUR. IT MAY BE PREPARED
BY STATE OR LOCAL AGENCIES RECEIVING FEDERAL FUNDING, BUT THE
FEDERAL AGENCY ADMINISTERING THE FUNDS BEARS THE ULTIMATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS SCOPE. UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, A
LESS COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT MAY BE PERMISSIBLE.
The Congressional purposes behind the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) are:
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment
and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to
enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural
resources important to the Nation . . . ,59
The primary tool for achieving these policy goals is the environ-
mental impact statement required under section 102(2) (C) of the
NEPA.60 This discussion will consider whether and when an environ-
mental impact statement (EIS) is required and who is responsible
for compiling the document. We will also discuss other environmental
documents that may be required. In addressing these questions, we
will emphasize the U.S. Department of Transportation regulations
implementing the NEPA because this agency oversees federally funded
Illinois highways and related drainage projects.61
1. Need for an Environmental Impact Statement
The EIS required by section 107 is the source of considerable
litigation by special interest groups seeking to protect the environ-
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ment. The threshold question in such litigation is whether a proposed
action is a "major" federal action "significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment." Preparation of an EIS thus depends on
showing that an undertaking is (1) major, (2) that it significantly
affects the quality of the human environment, and (3) that it is
federal.62
a. "Major actions" and "significant effects." Both terms
are very difficult to quantify, but one rule of thumb is that close cases
are resolved in favor of requiring the EIS.
63 In general, the greater
the threat of injury, the greater the likelihood of coverage. One
authority listed several other relevant factors, including:
1. The extent to which the action will cause adverse environmental
effects beyond those created by existing uses or by prior practice;
2. Whether more than one agency concurs in the conclusion that effects
will be insignificant;
3. Whether the action is consistent with local zoning requirements; and
4. The scope and size of the project and the extent of investment in
it.
64
b. Federal actions. A narrow reading of the NEPA would
interpret the term "federal actions" to mean only those actions
conceived, carried out, and managed by the federal government.
However, case law has interpreted the term broadly and soon estab-
lished that federal sanctioning of prior state or local activity can
constitute a "federal action."65 Federal Highway Administration reg-
ulations consider all their actions involving federal funds and requiring
federal approval to be federal administrative actions.
66 This regulation
appears to cover any project constructed with Federal Highway
Administration funds.
2. When is the EIS Required?
One of the primary purposes of the NEPA is to require consid-
eration of environmental impacts and alternatives "before project
momentum is irresistible, before options are closed, and before agency
commitments are set in concrete."67 Language in the NEPA makes it
clear that an EIS must be present in every agency "recommendation
or report on proposals."
68 To assure compliance with the NEPA, the
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) regulations suggest that:
Applicants intending to apply for funds should notify the Admin-
istration at the time that a particular project concept is identified.69
At the applicant's request, the Administration must advise him
or her of the class of action, related applicable environmental laws
and requirements, and specific studies normally required in the EIS. 70
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Under no circumstances should significant design activities, property
acquisitions, or construction begin until either an EIS is approved or
the activity is found to be excluded from the EIS requirement. 71
3. Who is Required to Prepare the EIS?
Section 102(2) (C) of the NEPA72 calls for a "detailed statement
by the responsible official." In general, courts require that federal
officials provide "significant," "active," and "extensive" involvement
in the preparation process.
73 Section 102(2)(D), 74 however, notes that
the EIS prepared for any major federal action funded under a grant
to a state will not be deemed insufficient solely because it was prepared
by a state agency or official if the "agency or official has statewide
jurisdiction and has the responsibility for such action." The responsible
federal official is to provide guidance, individually evaluate the EIS,
and solicit views of other federal agencies in drafting the EIS.
Under the Federal Highway Administration regulations, the
Administration must prepare the EIS in cooperation with the appli-
cant. 75 If the applicant is a state highway agency, state department
of transportation, or a local unit of government acting through a
state agency, the applicant may prepare the EIS, provided it complies
with section 102(2)(D) of the NEPA. However, regardless of the role
the applicant may assume, the Federal Highway Administration is
responsible for the decisions made on the scope of the appropriate
environmental document.
4. Other Environmental Documents
All agencies have procedures for dispensing with EIS requirements
when the action is neither major nor entails "significant effects." 7'
The FHWA regulations describe three classes of action that require
different levels of documentation under the NEPA process. 77
a. Class I (EIS). These actions may significantly affect the
environment and require an EIS.
b. Class II (categorical exclusions). These actions do not
individually or cumulatively have any significant effect on the envi-
ronment and do not require either an EIS or an environmental
assessment. The statute lists 29 actions as categorical exclusions, and
most of them pertain to studies of various kinds. Also included are
"reconstruction or modification of an existing bridge structure on
essentially the same alignment or location and rehabilitation or
widening of a road by less than one lane." The regulations qualify
the categorical exclusions in the following manners:
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1. Proposed categorical exclusions must be approved by the FHWA.
2. The FHWA may determine that extraordinary circumstances re-
quire an EIS. Situations likely to require an EIS include:
a. Significant impacts on the environment,
b. Substantial controversy on environmental grounds, and
c. Inconsistencies with any federal, state, or local law or admin-
istrative decision relating to the environment.
78
c. Class III (environmental assessments). This class encom-
passes actions in which the significance of the environmental impact
is not known. All actions other than Class I or Class II are Class III.
An environmental assessment must be prepared whenever a proposal
is outside the categorical exclusions, and the need for an EIS is
unclear. The objective of an environmental assessment (EA) is to
determine which aspects of the proposed actions might have envi-
ronmental impact; to identify measures and alternatives that might
mitigate adverse environmental impacts; and to identify other envi-
ronmental review and consultation requirements that should be
prepared concurrently with the environmental assessment.
79
Following submission of an EA to the FHWA, hearings are held
to determine whether an EIS is required and whether a finding of no
significant impact will exempt the applicant from the EIS requirement.
As a final note, practitioners should be aware that courts inter-
preting the NEPA have recognized supplemental environmental cri-
teria when agencies are seeking to comply with federal permit re-
quirements.
80 Sierra Club v. Army Corps of Engineers81 illustrates this
point. Here the appellate court ruled that although the Federal
Highway Administration and the Corps acted as leads in preparing
an EIS, the Corps was still required to investigate and issue a section
404 permit
82 for a landfill operation associated with the construction
of an interstate highway adjacent to a river. Thus, merely compiling
an EIS does not exclude an agency from complying with other
statutory permit requirements.
E. ADDITIONAL FEDERAL LAWS
SEVERAL FEDERAL STATUTES REQUIRE PERMITS FOR CONSTRUC-
TION IN NAVIGABLE WATERS. TWO EXECUTIVE ORDERS ALSO HAVE BEEN
ISSUED TO PROTECT WETLANDS AND FLOODPLAINS. IN ADDITION, CON-
GRESS HAS ADDRESSED THESE SPECIAL CONCERNS WITH THE FlSH AND
WILDLIFE COORDINATION ACT AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT.
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The Clean Water Act (CWA) and the National Environmental
Protection Act (NEPA) are the broadest pieces of federal legislation
affecting highway drainage. Federal laws yet to be discussed should
be interpreted under or in conjunction with the NEPA or the CWA.
For efficient reference, the executive orders, statutes, and regulations
are grouped in three ways: 1) those pertaining to wetlands, 2) those
pertaining to fish and wildlife conservation, and 3) those pertaining
to preservation of endangered species.
1. Wetlands
In addition to a section 404 permit required under the Clean
Water Act,
83 the Rivers and Harbors Act of 189984 requires a permit
from the Army Corps of Engineers whenever a party elects to
"excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify the course,
location, condition, or capacity of any port, roadsteads, haven, harbor,
canal, lake, harbor of refuge, ... or of the channel of any navigable
water of the United States. . . "86 For the purpose of the Rivers and
Harbors Act, the term "navigable waters" is defined more narrowly
than under the Clean Water Act:
The term 'navigable waters of the United States' means those waters
of the United States that are subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide shoreward to the mean high water mark, and/or . . . have been
used in the past, or may be susceptible to use to transport interstate
or foreign commerce.
86
In United States v. Weisman6
"
7
a Florida District Court found that
by placing road fill across tidal creeks located below the mean high
water line without a permit, the defendant violated section 10 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. Under the Act, a Corps permit is
required for any bridge, dam, causeway, or dike in any navigable
waters.88 Where section 10 and section 404 both apply, the Corps will
process a joint permit.
Executive Order 11990,89 "Protection of Wetlands," calls on each
agency of the federal government to provide leadership in wetlands
protection. The Order is implemented under the NEPA. Wetland
construction must be avoided unless there is no practical alternative.
If none is possible, all practicable measures must be taken to minimize
harm to the wetland. Illinois highway projects accepting federal aid
must comply with the Order.90 Somewhat related is Executive Order
11988,
91
which calls for consideration of alternatives to minimize
development and impact on the natural beneficial values of flood-
plains.
92
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2. Fish and Wildlife
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act covers any federal action
involving the alteration of any stream or other body of water for any
purpose, including drainage. Any public or private agency under
federal permit or license that wishes to alter a stream or body of
water must consider wildlife conservation and consult with the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, and the
head of the state fish and game agency.93 Case law indicates that the
Act must be considered virtually any time an environmental document
is prepared for a drainage-related project.
94
3. Endangered Species
The Endangered Species Act95 is intended to preserve threatened
and endangered species. Each federal agency must ensure that no
activity funded or carried out by the agency will harm endangered
species, and no funds may be committed to a project before compliance
with this Act is shown.96 The agency is to consult with the Secretary
of the Interior if any prospective action will be conducted where an
endangered or threatened species may be present. The biological
assessment required under this Act may be undertaken as part of the
EIS compliance.97
F. ILLINOIS SOIL EROSION AND
SEDIMENTATION CONTROL
THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE HAS ADOPTED
GUIDELINES FOR EROSION AND SEDIMENT CONTROL. SOIL AND WATER
CONSERVATION DISTRICTS ARE TO IMPLEMENT THOSE GUIDELINES,
ALTHOUGH THE AUTHORIZING ACT INCLUDES NO ENFORCEMENT MECH-
ANISM.
The Illinois Department of Agriculture has adopted guidelines
for erosion and sediment control pursuant to the Illinois Soil and
Water Conservation Districts Act.98 These state guidelines were adopted
in 198099 and will require landowners and occupiers to comply with
phased-in, increasingly stringent soil loss limits. Individual soil and
water conservation districts have adopted similar guidelines that are
at least as stringent as the state guidelines. They provide a mechanism
to encourage landowners to reduce erosion. When erosion is reduced,
drainage ditches and tile and other drainage structures are less likely
to be damaged by siltation.
The soil loss guidelines are based upon the "T" value, which is
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"the average annual tons per acre soil loss a given soil may experience
and still maintain its productivity over an extended period of time.
Both physical and economic factors are considered." 100 For most Illinois
soils, the "T" value will be between two and five tons of soil loss per
acre per year. These soil losses are estimated using the Universal Soil
Loss Equation. The goal of the guidelines is to reduce soil loss from
every acre to its "T'Value or less by the year 2000. Hence, the slogan
"T by 2000." Although some soil and water conservation districts
may have adopted more stringent soil loss limits or a more stringent
timetable, state guidelines expect "T by 2000" to be reached according
to the following timetable:
Effective January 1, 1983, to January 1, 1988, all land subject to
this program shall not be considered out of compliance with the
state program if the long-term annual soil losses are kept at or
below four "T" value.
Effective January 1, 1988, no soil erosion losses on gently sloping
land, not exceeding 5 percent slope, shall exceed "T" value, provided
this can be accomplished through conservation tillage. All other land
subject to this program shall be considered in compliance with the
state program if the long-term annual soil losses are kept at or
below double "T" during the period January 1, 1988, to January 1,
1994.
Effective January 1, 1994, to January 1, 2000, all land subject to
this program shall be considered in compliance with the state
program if the long-term annual soil losses are kept at or below one
and one-half "T" value.
Effective January 1, 2000, and thereafter, all land subject to the Act
shall meet "T" value. 101
The guidelines anticipate that "T" value will be attained by the
adoption or installation of such practices or structures as conservation
tillage systems, grassed waterways, terraces, or the seeding of per-
manent vegetative cover. State cost-sharing moneys may be available
to landowners to help defray the costs of these practices or structures.
The enforcement mechanism for guaranteeing compliance with
the guidelines is based on education and financial incentives. The
regulations enable any person to file a complaint who believes a
serious erosion and sediment problem exists.
102 The complaint is
generally filed with the soil and water conservation district in which
the problem land is > located 103 and should contain the following
information:
1. The name and address of the person or persons filing the complaint;
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2. The date on which the alleged violation was observed;
3. The location by legal description or metes and bounds of the land
being damaged by sediment;
4. The description of the nature and extent of the damage occurring;
5. The names and addresses of landowners and occupiers, if known,
and the location by legal description or by metes and bounds of
land believed to be the source of the excessive sediment; and
6. The signature of the person or persons filing the complaint and
the date filed.
Upon receiving a complaint, the soil and water conservation
district must notify the landowner involved, conduct an investigation,
determine whether a violation of the guidelines exists, and if it does,
give the landowner or occupier a Notice of Violation. The soil and
water conservation district must attempt to gain compliance with the
guidelines. If it fails, however, the Illinois Soil and Water Conservation
District Act does not provide for fines or other enforcement tools,
except as may exist under other legislation, such as the Illinois
Environmental Protection Act and its water pollution rules and
regulations.
Highway authorities should be aware of the soil loss control
program previously described because some township road commis-
sioners have successfully filed complaints. Although the current
program lacks a vigorous enforcement mechanism, soil and water
conservation district personnel have gained voluntary compliance
from individual landowners. Similarly, if erosion from the highway
authority property is causing sedimentation problems for adjacent
landowners, they might benefit from district contacts with the highway
authority.
G. STATE PERMITS
HIGHWAY AUTHORITIES, DRAINAGE DISTRICTS, OR INDIVIDUALS
CONSTRUCTING IN ILLINOIS STREAMS OR FLOODWAYS DRAINING MORE
THAN ONE SQUARE MILE IN URBAN AREAS OR TEN SQUARE MILES IN
RURAL AREAS REQUIRE A PERMIT FROM THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION, DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES.
Illinois statutes require Department of Transportation approval
of construction in any stream or floodway draining more than 640
acres in an urban area or 6,400 acres in a rural area. 104 Specifically
exempted from the law are "field tile systems, tile outlet structures,
terraces, water and sediment control basins, grade stabilization struc-
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tures, and grassed waterways that do not obstruct flood flows." 106 In
addition, most maintenance and repair of existing structures is
excluded. The law applies to any person, corporation, unit of local
government, or state agency.
The permit application is to include the name of the applicant,
site location, description of the project, statement of purpose, list of
potentially affected properties, and a discussion of the impact of the
project. Generally, construction will be approved if it does not "ad-
versely affect" any public body of water, obstruct navigability, result
in actual or potential flood damage, or adversely affect certain natural
conditions.
The Department of Transportation, Corps of Engineers, Illinois
EPA, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and Department of Conservation
have developed a joint permit application form. This multi-part form
simultaneously starts processing of the IDOT and Corps permits, fish
and wildlife and endangered species review, and water quality certi-
fication. Many types of minor work are now covered by nationwide
permits from the Corps of Engineers and comparable statewide permits
from the IDOT.
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CHAPTER VI: LEGAL
REMEDIES
A. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE
The body of substantive law governing drainage in Illinois has
been thoroughly reviewed in preceding sections of this study. If some
aspect of this law is violated, the question arises as to the proper
legal remedy for the injury. This chapter will discuss the remedies
applicable to the drainage laws. However, this brief review of legal
remedies is superficial and will illustrate only a few of the issues
involved in seeking legal remedies.
Individuals and highway authorities must conform to the natural
drainage laws.
1 Actions for damages against state authorities must be
brought in the Court of Claims,
2
while claims against political sub-
divisions can be brought in the circuit courts.
3 The appropriate parties
and forums under the statutory drainage laws are typically addressed
in the relevant statutes. 4
The two primary remedies are damages and injunctions. These
two modes of redress apply to both natural and statutory drainage
violations. In at least one statutory section, damages and injunctive
relief are expressly provided for.
5 In other situations, these remedies
are applied without express provision.
6 In addition, certain statutory
sections authorize a fine as the penalty for the specific violation
7
or
give the highway authority the right to fill certain ditches."
An additional remedy often pursued is that of self-help. Self-help
can be used either to enter upon the easement within a servient
estate to remove barriers to natural drainage
9
or to obstruct unlawful
flows from a dominant estate. 10 The following sections elaborate on
these remedies.
B. JURISDICTION
INDIVIDUALS, MUNICIPALITIES, COUNTIES, AND STATE HIGHWAY
AUTHORITIES ARE SUBJECT TO THE NATURAL DRAINAGE LAW WITH
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LIMITED EXCEPTIONS. ACTIONS INVOLVING PRIVATE LANDOWNERS,
COUNTIES OR MUNICIPALITIES, OR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST THE
STATE ARE BROUGHT IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS. ACTIONS SEEKING
MONETARY DAMAGES FROM THE STATE ARE BROUGHT IN THE COURT
OF CLAIMS.
The preceding chapters have discussed the various drainage rights
and obligations of landowners. This chapter will address the parties
that can be subjected to an action for drainage rights violations and
identify the forums where a case may be litigated.
1. Parties
Municipal,
11
county,
12 and state highway authorities 13 are governed
by the drainage laws in the same manner as an individual landowner.
They are therefore subject to the same actions and remedies. 14 A
primary distinction is that public bodies can often utilize condem-
nation proceedings to secure drainage easements,
15
avoiding much
potential litigation. In addition, public bodies cannot be subjected to
a claim of adverse possession or prescription.
2. Forums
Between individual landowners, counties,
16 and municipal cor-
porations,
17
drainage actions are brought in the circuit courts of
Illinois. 18 If the plaintiff seeks monetary damages, any drainage dispute
involving the state or one of its agencies is to be brought in the Court
of Claims. If the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, the dispute comes
before the circuit court. 19
Most litigation against a highway authority begins with a com-
plaint to the authority from a landowner who feels harmed by the
authority's actions. It is the policy of the Department of Transpor-
tation to recognize and take prompt actions to correct any problem
for which the Department is responsible. Should the Department not
be responsible, the utmost tact is to be used to explain why it is not
responsible.
20
C. RELIEF
NOMINAL, SPECIAL, AND PERMANENT DAMAGES ARE AVAILABLE
REMEDIES FOR DRAINAGE VIOLATIONS. DETERMINING THE NATURE
AND EXTENT OF MONETARY DAMAGES IS OFTEN DIFFICULT. INJUNC-
TIONS ARE AVAILABLE IN INSTANCES OF SUBSTANTIAL OR IRREPARABLE
INJURY AND WHERE NO ADEQUATE LEGAL REMEDY EXISTS. FINALLY,
SELF-HELP MAY BE AVAILABLE, SIMPLIFYING THE REMEDY PROCESS.
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1. Damages
The term "damages" has been defined as a compensation, recom-
pense, or satisfaction in money for a loss or injury sustained. 21 Subject
to certain limitations to be discussed shortly, damages may be re-
covered by injured parties because of violation of a natural drainage
rule. For example, damages have been recovered when the violations
involved diversion,
22
obstruction,
23 and overflow. 24
Although the right to damages may be clear, problems are often
encountered in measuring the extent of the damages. The general
rules are well defined but their application proves difficult. "General"
or "nominal" damages are those presumed by the law to have been
sustained because of the legal wrong committed by the defendant.
Recovery for any such technical legal injury does not present a
measurement problem. The court has stated that "every violation of
a right imports some damage, and if none other be proved, the law
allows nominal damages."25 Thus the plaintiff may recover a nominal
sum (often $1.00) for any technical invasion of a right, regardless of
actual injury sustained.
"Special" or "substantial" damages on the other hand should
compensate for injuries actually suffered.
26 These damages create
measurement problems. Damages in this category are classified as
temporary or permanent according to the type of injury sustained. 27
Permanent damages are those of a lasting or enduring nature. In an
action for permanent damages, the plaintiff may recover not only
present but future damages. Because both present and future damages
are recoverable, such recovery bars all future actions by that plaintiff
or any other person holding the property through him or her. 28
Permanent damages are measured by the difference between fair
market price of a parcel before and after the injury. 29
Where the injury is not of such lasting or enduring nature as to
be termed "permanent," a measure of temporary damages applies. If
the injury can be corrected, only those sustained up to the com-
mencement of the lawsuit may be recovered. Because only present
damages are recoverable, successive causes of action may be brought.
This point is illustrated by an early Illinois Supreme Court case,
Schlitz Brewing Company v. Compton. 30
In Compton the plaintiff sought to recover damages for flooding
caused by an illegal change in drainage by the adjacent defendant.
At trial the plaintiff tried to introduce evidence of damages caused
by rains that occurred after the suit was filed. The court did not
permit the introduction of the evidence because the nuisance was
intermittent, occurring only after heavy rains:
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In all those cases where the cause of the injury is in its nature
permanent, . . . the entire damage may be recovered in a single
action; but, where the cause of the injury is in the nature of a
nuisance and not permanent in its character, but of such a character
that it may be supposed that the defendant would remove it rather
than suffer at once the entire damage, . . . actions may be maintained
from time to time as long as the cause of the injury continues.
31
Damages for temporary injuries are measured by the cost to repair
or restore the property to its condition prior to the injury plus an
amount for the loss of use. The court has phrased this measure as
"such a sum as would put his property in as good condition as it was
before it was injured by the flooding, together with compensation for
any loss of use during the time it was rendered unfit for occupation."
31
One decision applying the permanent/temporary distinction also
considered the use of the land in assessing the proper remedy. Where
land damage is purely financial, the lesser of two figures the cost
of repair or the diminution in value is considered satisfactory.
However, when the property is held for a personal use, such as a
residence, the cost of repair is the proper measure of damages, provided
it is not excessive relative to the land value. 33
It is not always clear whether damage to a landowner is temporary
or permanent. An appellate court case, Firestone v. Fritz,
34 discusses
this issue. A structure that unreasonably increases the burden on a
landowner can be injurious by reason of its construction. However,
if the structure is used in a way that may or may not cause injury,
the intermittent damages may be considered temporary. But the court
emphasized,
The fact that flooding may be uncertain in time, duration, and
extent does not prevent an improvement, which displays obvious
potential to cause an unnatural overflow upon completion, from
constituting an immediate, permanent injury.
35
Thus, whether an injury is permanent or not is a question of fact
that seems to turn on the potential and degree of unnatural overflows.
36
The damages recoverable for injuries to growing crops have been
a source of controversy in Illinois decisions. The rule on the destruction
of growing crops is clear: damages to immature growing crops are the
"value of the crops as they were when destroyed, together with the
value of the right which the owner had to mature the crops and
harvest or gather them at the proper time."37 The means of arriving
at this value has been the focus of dispute.
One view holds that the value at the time of destruction is
ascertained by estimating maturity value and deducting estimated
future cultivation, harvesting, and marketing costs.38 Another view
holds that the value at the time of destruction should be ascertained
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by estimating what the crop would have brought in its immature
condition. This estimate would necessarily be based on soil condition
and quality, nature of crop, probable yield, hazard of maturity, and
so forth.39
A different measure is applied to crops destroyed before they
have come up or before they have reached a point where their immature
value can be determined: "When crops planted are destroyed before
coming up, the measure of damages is the rental value of the land,
the cost of the seed, and the value of the labor expended."40
Courts can also assess punitive or exemplary damages. Only two
Illinois appellate court cases consider the award of punitive damages
in a drainage case.
41 In both instances the court found that the
defendant's conduct did not warrant punitive damages. In discussing
denial of the award one court stated, "Punitive damages are not a
'favorite in the law,' and are allowable only where the conduct is
accompanied by aggravated circumstances such as willfulness, malice,
fraud, or violence."
42 While no Illinois court has actually assessed
punitive damages in a drainage case, there is no apparent reason why
punitive damages should not be available in this area of the law,
provided defendant's conduct warrants such an award.
43
However,
governmental bodies are normally exempted from punitive damages.
44
Certain questions arise when the party seeking to bring an action
is either a landlord or a tenant. A tenant clearly has the right to
recover damages for injuries to crops during his or her period of
tenancy.
45
However, the tenant may not recover if the condition
existed at the beginning of the tenancy with the tenant's knowledge.
46
The landlord may have a cause of action in addition to that of
the tenant.
"[I]f a person interferes with the tenant so far as to
disturb his enjoyment of the use of the premises and thereby causes
loss of rent or damages to the landlord, he [the landlord] may have
action."47
Just as the landlord-tenant relationship may affect the right of
the particular party to bring an action, the grantor-grantee relation-
ship may have a similar effect. An injury existing when land is
transferred cannot be the basis for action by the grantee against the
wrongdoer. The injury was to the grantor, and he or she is the proper
party to bring the action.
48
A grantee who comes into possession of land creating a drainage
nuisance cannot be held liable until he or she has first been notified
to remove the nuisance. However, notice may not be required where
a nuisance is actively prolonged, where the grantee actively partici-
pates in the nuisance, or where the grantee uses a structure in a
manner previously thought to be a nuisance.
49
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2. Injunction
The second of the two primary remedies for natural drainage
rules violations is the injunction. An injunction is a judicial process
whereby a party is required to do or refrain from doing a particular
act.50 In general, the remedy is a preventive one,
51 and its usual
purpose is to restrain.
52
The following court opinion best conveys the prerequisites for an
injunction. Note that the plaintiff must show facts and that the court
acts only with extreme caution.
To entitle a person to relief by injunction he must establish an
actual and substantial injury, and not merely a technical or incon-
sequential wrong entitling him to nominal damages; and this is true
whether the injury be single or continuous. The courts move with
caution in granting any injunction . . . ,53
Substantial and irreparable injury must be threatened. 54 Conjec-
tural apprehensions are not sufficient. 55 Therefore, if it is not rea-
sonably certain that injury will result, the injunction will be denied. 56
The foregoing discussion presupposes that an order to cease or
not to begin, that is, a negative order, will prevent or terminate the
injury. In some situations, however, the plaintiff can only be protected
by a positive act of the defendant. Such a situation gives rise to the
mandatory injunction, a device that commands the performance of
some positive act. Because this type of order is difficult to supervise
and control, the courts do not favor the mandatory injunction.57
Despite their reluctance, however, this remedy has been used to
compel the return of water to its natural channel58 and to compel the
removal of an obstruction from a natural watercourse.59
In considering granting an injunction, the first general rule is
that it will not be granted when the plaintiff has another adequate
remedy at law.60 This rule means that the plaintiff may not obtain
an injunction if damages constitute adequate compensation. The
Illinois Supreme Court applied this principle to the subject of drainage
when it said:
It is true that to justify relief by injunction an actual and substantial
injury must be shown . . . but this does not mean that the injury
must necessarily be great in the pecuniary loss involved or impossible
of compensation in damages. When an owner of property is about
to be deprived of a legal right in connection with it by the wrongful
act of another for which there is no legal redress, the act may be
restrained by injunction, or, if it has already been executed, may
be required to be undone, if this is practicable. The irreparable
injury necessary to give a court of equity jurisdiction in such a case
is not one so great as to be impossible of compensation but one of
such a character that the law cannot give adequate compensation
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for it. The fact that no actual damages can be proved, so that in
an action at law the jury could award nominal damages only, often
furnishes the very best reason why a court of equity should interfere
in a case where a nuisance is a continuous one.61
A second general rule is that an injunction will not be issued
until the existence of a nuisance has been established at law. The
courts have long recognized, however, that strict application of this
rule would be a formidable barrier to adequate protection of property
rights. The rule was substantially discredited in 1875 when the court
said:
[T]o say that such a nuisance must be suffered to be created and
continued until its character shall be formally determined at law,
would seem to be but little better than a mockery of justice to him
whose residence is affected by it.
62
Because of this pragmatic attitude, injunctions are useful and
effective remedies in the area of drainage litigation. They have been
frequently used to prevent diversion,
63
obstruction,
64
deposition of
sewage,
65
unlawful connection to a mutual drain,66 and so forth. In
addition, since the rules of natural drainage may be applied to highway
authorities and to individuals, highway authorities have received some
of these injunctions.67
3. Self-help
A third remedy that is sometimes available to an aggrieved
landowner is self-help. This remedy avoids the high costs and bad
feelings that often accompany litigation. Self-help is permitted in two
situations: first, in order to enter upon the easement over a servient
estate to remove obstructions68 and second, allowing a servient land-
owner to obstruct wrongful flows from a dominant estate.69
Wessels v. Colebank,
70 an early Supreme Court case, addresses the
right of a drainage easement holder to enter upon the servient estate
to maintain the easement. In essence, the landowners having a
perpetual easement in the form of a drain across another's land have
a right to go upon the servient estate and make necessary repairs to
keep the flow unobstructed, as long as the servient estate is not
unnecessarily damaged. Although no cases specifically address a
natural drainage easement, the broad language of Wessels, as well as
the language in subsequent appellate cases, suggests that all types of
drainage easements include the right of access to the servient estate
for maintenance purposes. 71
It is important to realize that the dominant estate owner cannot
compel the servient landowner to remove natural obstructions. 72 Thus,
when a natural obstruction impedes the drainage of a dominant estate,
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the landowner's only remedy is to enter upon the easement and
remove the obstruction. Furthermore, access rights are limited to
maintenance purposes, and the dominant landowner is not permitted
to harm the servient estate. 73
An early appellate court case upheld a servient landowner's right
to obstruct unlawful flows from a dominant estate. 74 The court held
that a servient landowner could obstruct unlawful flows if it could
be accomplished without a breach of the peace. While this right of
obstruction does exist, the good husbandry and reasonable use ex-
ceptions to the natural drainage rule make it very difficult to determine
when increased flows become unlawful. 75 Thus, if a servient landowner
mistakenly obstructs lawful flows, he or she may be liable for any
resulting damage to the dominant landowner. Finally, if a servient
landowner has maintained an embankment across a channel for
longer than twenty years, the prescriptive period, he or she may
restore the embankment if it has been washed away. However, he or
she may not increase the height beyond that of the original embank-
ment. 76
Highway authorities and drainage districts may also use the power
of condemnation, which is related to self-help. If a state entity
possessing this power must drain onto the land of another outside
the course of natural drainage, the state entity may condemn an
easement. This power is limited only by the requirements of necessity
and just compensation. 77 Under the Drainage Code, a private land-
owner may pass a covered drain under the land of another78 but there
are serious questions as to the constitutionality of this provision.
79
D. LIMITATIONS ON GRANTING OF DAMAGES
AND INJUNCTIONS
IN SOME INSTANCES, CIRCUMSTANCES WILL LIMIT AN AVAILABLE
REMEDY.
The legal remedies discussed in the two preceding sections are
not always applicable. Certain circumstances may preclude either
remedy, even though a drainage rule has been violated. For example,
the plaintiff may not be entitled to the remedy sought because the
time under the statute of limitations has run out80 or because the
party being sued cannot be made a defendant in a court of law or
equity.
81 Another limitation might involve the different degrees of
liability placed upon a highway authority, depending upon whether a
ministerial or a discretionary duty is performed.
82
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CHAPTER VII: SUMMARY
This chapter summarizes the basic principles of drainage law
discussed in the previous chapters. These principles are grouped
according to the chapters in which they were fully developed.
A. NATURAL DRAINAGE RULES
Landowners, including highway authorities, may drain water away
as it would drain in a state of nature. Lower landowners, including
highway authorities, must accept water flowing naturally onto or
through their lands and have no right to interfere with such natural
drainage.
In the interest of good husbandry, dominant estate owners may
construct open or covered drains on their lands for agricultural
purposes, even though they may increase the flow of drainage water
in the watercourses from the dominant to the servient estates.
Dominant estate owners, however, must discharge the waters at the
natural point where they would have entered the servient estates,
and they generally may not cut or tile through divides so that waters
from different watersheds are discharged upon the servient estates.
The amount and manner of water discharged upon the lower owner
may be subject to a reasonableness limitation. Construction in streams
may require a permit from the Illinois Department of Transportation
and the Corps of Engineers.
In nonagricultural settings and absent local ordinances specifying
storm drainage and detention requirements, dominant estate owners
may drain their land into public drains or onto servient lands. The
increased flow of surface water must be consistent with the policy of
"reasonableness of use." Large drainage improvements may require a
permit from the Illinois Department of Transportation and the Corps
of Engineers.
The purpose of highway ditches and subsurface drains is to drain
excess water off the^ highway right-of-way. It is not an obligation of
highway authorities to construct ditches and subsurface drains in
order to improve the natural drainage on adjacent lands. However,
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without acquiring an easement of obstruction by agreement, prescrip-
tion, or condemnation, the highway authority has no right to obstruct
natural drainage across its right-of-way.
Servient estate owners may not intentionally obstruct water-
courses flowing across their lands, but they have no duty to keep
them clear of brush, silt, or debris carried by nature. Because of their
drainage easements, dominant estate owners may go upon the servient
estates to make repairs as long as they do not injure the land
unnecessarily.
Rights and responsibilities of natural drainage can be altered by
agreement between the parties, through prescriptive easements, and
where a governmental entity is involved, through exercise of the
power of eminent domain. A period of twenty years is necessary to
acquire an easement of drainage or obstruction by prescription.
B. STATUTORY DRAINAGE RULES
Highway authorities are subject to the natural drainage law.
Through the power of eminent domain, however, a highway authority
may modify its natural drainage rights. In addition, a highway
authority may contract with landowners to alter its drainage obli-
gations. The Highway Code makes it illegal to obstruct or injure a
highway and requires a permit for any work in a right-of-way. In
general, a highway authority is liable for maintenance and repair of
ditches in a right-of-way that benefits the highway.
The organization of drainage districts in Illinois is governed by
the Drainage Code. Highway authorities are exempted from assess-
ment by drainage districts. In general, drainage districts may use
highway rights-of-way, subject to a permit by the highway authority.
In addition, drainage districts must compensate adjacent landowners
whose property rights are invaded. Drainage districts possess the
power of eminent domain and probably can exercise eminent domain
against a highway authority. In some circumstances drainage districts
are required by statute to obtain a permit from the Department of
Transportation.
Individual landowners may contract with a highway authority to
construct a drainage tile in the highway to accommodate the land-
owners' drainage in addition to that of the highway. An individual
may obtain permission to operate a drain in a highway authority's
right-of-way for up to twenty years. Injuring or obstructing highways
is prohibited without authority approval.
The Drainage Code authorizes an individual landowner to extend
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a covered drain through another's land. However, this provision may
not be constitutional under the current Illinois Constitution.
The Drainage Code permits the formation of mutual drainage
systems. However, because highway authorities may not be assessed
as members of a mutual drainage system, these provisions practically
apply only between private landowners.
C. BRIDGES AND CULVERTS
When a highway crosses a natural drain or ditch developed in
the course of natural drainage, the highway authority must construct
and maintain a bridge or culvert. It must be sufficient to serve the
drainage needs of the public for all future time. However, if a drainage
district increases the capacity of the natural drain or ditch or changes
its alignment and thereby threatens the bridge crossing it, the drainage
district is liable to the highway authority for the cost of protecting
the bridge. When a drainage district drain crosses an existing highway
other than in the course of natural drainage, the district is liable to
the highway authority for construction, repair, and maintenance costs.
In urban areas drainage matters are handled by municipal cor-
porations as opposed to drainage districts exercising storm drainage
powers. Municipal corporations are liable for the cost of bridge
construction over artificial channels and for replacing bridges de-
stroyed by deepening or widening natural channels. Maintenance
appears to be the responsibility of highway authorities or municipal-
ities within whose jurisdiction the street or highway lies.
Where drainage districts construct open drains that cut off private
lands from public highways, the drainage district must provide access
across the ditch, or in some cases it must compensate the landowner
for construction and cost. Where highway ditches constructed along-
side a highway as part of the highway drainage system deprive an
adjacent landowner of access to the highway, the authority must
install adequate culverts or other crossings. If additional culverts
become necessary because additional houses and driveways are con-
structed, the highway authority may issue a permit so the homebuilder
can install the culvert.
D. DRAINAGE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Landowners who suffer an unreasonable invasion of the use and
enjoyment of their properties may bring a private nuisance action. A
public nuisance action may be brought by a public official against
any action that threatens the public health, safety, or welfare. Federal
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water pollution legislation has created a statutory nuisance action
that may be more far-reaching than common law nuisance actions.
Where a nuisance is found to exist, the court may enjoin the nuisance
conduct, or it may require the party creating the nuisance to pay
damages.
The Federal Clean Water Act is designed to regulate all point-
source discharges into the waters of the United States. Unless
exempted, a discharge must be authorized by a national pollutant
discharge elimination system permit. Permits are also required for
discharge of dredged and fill material in the waters of the United
States and on wetlands.
Under the National Environment Policy Act, federal agencies are
required to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) prior
to any major federal action that significantly affects the quality of
the human environment. The EIS must be approved before significant
design activities or property acquisitions occur. The environmental
impact statement may be prepared by state or local agencies receiving
federal funding, but the federal agency administering the funds bears
the ultimate responsibility for the scope of this document. Under
certain circumstances, a less comprehensive environmental report
may be permissible.
A number of federal statutes require permits for construction in
navigable waters. Two executive orders have been issued to protect
wetlands and floodplains. In addition, Congress has passed the Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act and the Endangered Species Act to
protect these special concerns. Construction by highway authorities,
drainage districts, or individuals in streams or floodways that drain
one square mile in urban areas or ten square miles in rural areas
requires a permit from the Illinois Department of Transportation.
The Department of Transportation and Corps of Engineers use a
joint application form that triggers environmental and water quality
reviews.
The Illinois Department of Agriculture has adopted guidelines
for erosion and sediment control. Soil and water conservation districts
implement the guidelines, although no enforcement mechanism is
included in the authorizing act.
Soil loss guidelines have been published under the Illinois Soil
and Water Conservation Districts Act. Maximum soil losses allowed
under these guidelines are being phased in gradually, but the goal is
to limit such losses to two to five tons per acre per year by the year
2000. These guidelines and the complaint mechanism through which
they are implemented may help highway authorities and landowners
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whose drainage ditches and tiles are damaged by sedimentation from
excessive erosion on nearby lands.
E. LEGAL REMEDIES
With limited exceptions, individuals, municipalities, counties, and
state highway authorities are all subject to drainage law. Actions
involving private landowners, counties, and municipalities and actions
seeking injunctive relief against the state are brought in the circuit
courts. Actions seeking monetary damages from the state are brought
in the Court of Claims.
Nominal, special, and permanent damages are available remedies
for drainage violations. Determining the nature and extent of mon-
etary damages is often difficult. Injunctions are available for sub-
stantial or irreparable injuries and where no other adequate legal
remedy exists. In addition, self-help may be available, simplifying the
remedy process. For example, if one's drainage is impaired because
natural obstructions are blocking the watercourse on the servient
land, the owner of the dominant estate may enter the servient estate
to remove the natural obstructions.

GLOSSARY
Acquiescence. Conduct recognizing the existence of a transaction
and intended, at least to some extent, to carry the transaction or
permit it to be carried into effect. The act may not deliberately be
intended to ratify a former transaction that is known to be voidable,
but it recognizes the transaction as existing and to some extent at
least, it carries it into effect or obtains or claims the benefits resulting
from it. Thus acquiescence differs from "confirmation," which implies
a deliberate act intended to renew and ratify a transaction known to
be voidable.
Artificial watercourse. A watercourse generally owing its origin to
acts of man. Examples are canals, drainage ditches, and subsurface
drains.
Basin. A natural or artificially created space or structure that is
capable of holding water by reason of its shape and the character of
its confining material; the surface area within a given watershed.
Bridge. A structure erected on foundations, piers, or abutments over
a depression or an obstacle such as a river, roadway, or railroad; it
carries a roadway for vehicular and pedestrian traffic and provides
an opening of twenty feet or more between bearings.
Civil law. A written code of laws that originated in ancient Rome
and that is still used in many countries. It is distinguished from
English common law, which is based on statutes and court decisions.
(Louisiana is the only state now under civil law, although Illinois and
some others have adopted natural drainage rules like those in the
civil law.)
Codification. The rearrangement of all the laws on a particular
subject under one general title and in one place.
Common enemy rule. Surface water is a common enemy, and each
landowner has an unlimited legal privilege to deal with it as he or
she pleases without regard to the consequences that might be suffered
by a neighbor. Opposed to it is the natural drainage rule, which
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requires the owner of lower land to accept surface water that naturally
drains onto that land.
Common law. The body of principles that evolved from traditional
usage and custom and that now receives judicial recognition and
sanction through repeated application. These principles develop in-
dependent of legislation and are embodied in court decisions.
Condemnation. A legal proceeding to secure private land for a public
purpose after reasonable payment for it. Condemnation proceedings
are used when an owner does not convey title voluntarily. Eminent
domain proceedings are condemnation proceedings.
Contiguous. Adjacent or touching.
Contract. An agreement to do or refrain from doing a certain thing.
Consideration, legal subject matter, competent parties, and a meeting
of the minds of the parties must all be present.
Culvert. A closed conduit other than a bridge that conveys water in
a natural channel or waterway beneath and across a roadway.
Department. The Illinois Department of Transportation, usually
acting through its district engineers.
Defendant. The person or group defending or denying; the party
against whom relief or recovery is sought in an action or suit; the
accused in a criminal case.
Diffused surface water. Water that flows across land in no defined
channel.
Dicta. An observation or remark made by a judge concerning a
question raised by a case but not necessarily involved in it or essential
to its determination.
Ditch. An artificially constructed open drain or a natural drain that
has been artificially improved.
Diversion. The deflection
.of surface waters or stream waters into a
watercourse to which they are not naturally tributary.
Divide. The watershed or peak of land from which the heads of
streams or runoff waters flow in opposite directions.
Dominant estate or tenement. In a drainage context, the dominant
estate is higher land from which water naturally flows. The land to
which the water naturally flows is the servient estate.
Dominant land. Property so situated that its owners have rights on
adjacent property, such as a right-of-way or a right of natural drainage.
The adjacent land is called the servient land.
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Drain. Any ditch, watercourse, or conduit, whether open, covered,
or enclosed, natural or artificial, or partly natural and partly artificial,
by which waters coming or falling upon lands are carried away.
Drainage. The general term applied to the removal of surface or
ground water from a given area either by gravity or by pumping.
Drainage area. The area from which water originates at a given
point or location on a stream.
Drainage district. A legal entity formed to construct, maintain, or
repair drains or levees or to enlarge other drainage or levee work for
agricultural, sanitary, or mining purposes.
Drainage structures. Those structures other than drains, levees,
and pumping plants that are intended to promote or aid drainage.
Such structures may be independent of other drainage work, or they
may be a part of or incidental to such work. The term includes but
is not restricted to catch-basins, bulkheads, spillways, flumes, drop-
boxes, pipe outlets, junction boxes, and structures whose primary
purpose is to prevent the erosion of soil into a drain.
Drainage system. A system by which lands are drained and protected
from overflow, including use of drains, drainage structures, levees,
and pumping plants.
Easement. An interest in another's land that allows the easement
owner to use the other's land for special purposes consistent with the
other's general property rights; for example, the right to have water
flow across a neighbor's land.
Effluent. Liquid that flows out of a containing space; in particular
sewage, water, or other liquid that is partially or completely treated
or in its natural state that flows out of a reservoir, basin, treatment
plant, or part thereof; an overflowing branch of a main stream or
lake; a stream fed by ground water.
Elevation. Altitude; height in relation to sea level or any assumed
datum.
Eminent domain. The power of the state to take private property
for public use.
Erosion. Wearing away of land surface by running water, wind, or
other geological agents.
Enjoin. To require, command, estop, or positively direct. To require
a person by writ of injunction to perform or to abstain or desist from
some act.
Equity. A system of jurisprudence administered by courts of equity
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as opposed to courts of law. Equity jurisdiction operates in circum-
stances where the generality, rigidity, and inflexibility of law do not
permit a court to provide an adequate remedy. Among the most
important of the remedies granted by a court of equity is the injunction.
Fee simple. The unqualified ownership of land.
Flood water. Former stream waters that have escaped a watercourse
to flow or stand over adjoining lands.
Flow line. The bed of a stream or culvert.
Heritage. Every type of immovable that can be the subject of property,
such as lands, houses, orchards, woods, marshes, ponds, etc., in
whatever mode they may have been acquired, either by descent or
purchase.
Highway. Any public way for vehicular travel laid out pursuant to
any law of the State or the Territory of Illinois; or which has been
established by dedication or used by the public as a highway for
fifteen years; or which has been or may be laid out to connect a
subdivision or plotted land with a public highway and that has been
dedicated for the use of the owners of the land in the subdivision or
plotted land where such dedication has been accepted and used and
which has not been vacated pursuant to law. The term "highway"
includes rights-of-way, bridges, drainage structures, signs, guardrails,
protective structures, and all other structures and appurtenances
necessary or convenient for vehicular traffic. A highway in a rural
area may be called a road, while a highway in a municipal area may
be called a street.
Highway authority. The state department concerned with state
highways; the county board with respect to county highways or county
unit district roads if a discretionary function is involved; the county
superintendent of highways if a ministerial function is involved; the
highway commissioner with respect to township or district roads not
in a county unit road district; or the corporate authorities of a
municipality with respect to municipal streets.
Injunction. A judicial order requiring one to do or refrain from doing
a particular act. When the injunction commands the performance of
a positive act, it is termed "mandatory."
Invert. The floor, bottom, or lowest portion of the internal cross
section of a conduit.
Jurisdiction. The authority or range of authority for a governing
body.
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Land. Real property, including but not restricted to lots, railroad
rights-of-way, public highways, streets and alleys, and easements.
Landowner. The owner of real property, including an owner of an
undivided interest, a life tenant, a remainderman, and a trustee under
an active trust; but not including a mortgagee, a trustee under a trust
deed in the nature of a mortgage, a lien holder, or a lessee.
Lien. A legal claim against particular property for services rendered
the property. A drainage assessment is a legal claim against an
assessed property.
Litigate. To pursue in court through a lawsuit.
Maintenance. Preserving and keeping each type of roadway, roadside,
structure, and facility as close as possible to its original condition or
as later improved.
Ministerial duty. A duty in which nothing is left to discretion; a
simple and definite duty imposed by law and arising under conditions
admitted or proved to exist.
Natural drainage rule. Where two adjoining pieces of land are so
situated that one is dominant and the other servient, the dominant
landowner has the right to have water flow naturally from his or her
land to that of the servient landowner.
Natural watercourse. The course followed by water where the
conformation of land is such that it gives the water a fixed and
determinate course and discharges it uniformly upon the servient
tract at a fixed and definite point.
Parol. Oral or verbal.
Plaintiff. A person who brings an action; the party who complains
or sues in a civil action and is so named on the record; a person who
seeks remedial relief for an injury to rights; a complainant; the
prosecution in a criminal case.
Plans. Approved drawings or reproductions of drawings pertaining
to the construction or details of work.
Prescriptive rights. An easement of drainage through a ditch, drain,
or culvert to or across the land of another. In order to acquire this
right, open, adverse, and uninterrupted use of the drainage facility
must be shown under a claim of right for the required time.
Prima facie. A fact appearing or presumed to be true unless disproved
by some evidence to "the contrary.
Promulgate. The act of publishing or announcing officially.
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Proprietor. An owner or a person who has legal title or exclusive
right to some property, whether in possession or not.
Public road. A road constructed on dedicated right-of-way and
accepted by a public agency.
Quasi-corporations. Organizations resembling corporations; munic-
ipal societies or similar bodies.
Right-of-way. The entire area reserved for the construction and
maintenance of a roadway and the improvement of the roadsides.
Right-of-way plan. A number of right-of-way plats indicating all
rights-of-way in one particular section.
Right-of-way plat. A drawing of a tract of right-of-way to be
acquired from property owners. The plat shows location, width, length,
acreage, and legal description of the tract.
Roadway. That portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordi-
narily used for vehicular travel.
Rural area. All locations outside an urban area.
Servient estate or tenement. An estate that owes a duty or a
service to another estate. The dominant tenement is the estate to
which the duty or service is owed.
Servient land. If two adjoining pieces of land are so situated that
one piece is at a lower elevation than the other, the lower piece of
land is considered to be servient.
Sewage. The water supply of a community after it has been fouled
by various uses. It may be a combination of the wastes carried from
residences, business buildings, institutions, and industrial establish-
ments together with such ground water, surface water, and storm
water as may be present.
Statute of limitations. An act of the legislature that sets a period
of time within which a legal action must be brought. In the case of
interests in land, the period is usually twenty years from the time
the right to sue first arises. The statute makes the wrongdoer immune
from suit after the term has expired.
Statutory law. Laws enacted by the General Assembly to enlarge
or change the common law.
Stream water. Former surface or ground waters that have entered
and now flow in a well-defined natural watercourse together with
other waters reaching the stream by direct precipitation or rising
from springs in the bed or banks of the watercourse.
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Subsurface drainage. Collection and removal of underground water.
Surface drainage. Collection and removal of water from the surface
of the road and the ground.
Surface water. Waters that fall on the land from the skies or arise
in springs and diffuse themselves over the surface of the ground,
following no defined course or channel, and not gathering into or
forming any more definite body of water than a mere bog or marsh.
They are lost by being diffused over the ground through percolation,
evaporation, or natural drainage.
Urban area. An incorporated or unincorporated area that has been
developed primarily for residential or business purposes.
Watershed. The area contained within a divide above a specific point
on a stream.
Writ of mandamus. A writ from a court of superior jurisdiction
directed to a private or municipal corporation, its officers, executive,
administrative, or juidicial, or to an inferior court, commanding the
performance of a particular act therein specified and belonging to the
public, official, or ministerial duty. The writ directs the restoration
of the complainant to rights or privileges of which he or she has been
illegally deprived.











